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SUMMARY

This dissertation analyzes competition for foundation grants in the nonprofit
sector. First, I examine how inter-organization competition and foundation activity in
local grants markets affect organization behavior through institutional pressure on (1)
firm fundraising expenses, (2) program expense ratios, and (3) revenue diversification.
Second, I explore the impacts of nonprofit program expense ratios and fundraising
expenses on foundation grantmaking. This analysis focuses on the relative “prices” of
donations to competing nonprofit organizations, represented by these expense ratios, and
the impact prices have on foundation grant decisions relative to the impact that nonprofit
marketing has. Finally, I examine whether greater competition in grants markets
increases the importance of program expense ratios and firm marketing behavior for grant
selection. Overall, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of organization
behavior and foundation influence in grant-seeking markets and competition’s role in the
distribution of charitable grants.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: COMPETITION FOR CHARITABLE
RESOURCES IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR AND WHY IT
MATTERS

Nonprofit organizations compete with each other and with for-profit and
government organizations in a variety of ways. Nonprofit organizations in similar service
areas and geographic markets regularly compete with each other for charitable donations,
volunteers, and other scarce philanthropic or public revenues. Nonprofits sell private
goods and provide public goods, competing in markets with both for-profits and
government agencies. In industries such as health, residential care, daycare, and
education, nonprofits compete with for-profit firms and government agencies for human
resources, clients, market share, market visibility, and fees for service, contracts, or other
funding (Brown, 2010; Kearns, 2006). Inter-organization competition among nonprofits
is perhaps most pronounced in the pursuit of charitable resources, including foundation
grants. Since more nonprofits apply for foundation funding than can be funded at the
amounts requested, there are winners and losers in the grants marketplace.
The nonprofit sector has grown rapidly in recent decades. From 1970 to 2000, the
nonprofit sector’s contribution to the U.S. GDP rose from 3.1 to 4.2 percent (Boris and
Steuerle, 2006). From 1998 to 2008, the number of 501(c)(3) public charities grew 60.5
percent, with their expenses growing 92.6 percent (45.8 percent, adjusting for inflation)
(Wing, Roeger, and Pollak, 2010). Over the same period, the growth in the number of
grantmaking foundations matched the growth in charities, and total grantmaking grew by
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84 percent (Wing, Roeger, and Pollak, 2010). Meanwhile, all private contributions
(which include foundation grants) only grew by 32 percent (6 percent, adjusting for
inflation) from 2000 to 2009, which did not match the growth in nonprofit outputs or the
growth of the general economy over that time (Wing, Roeger, and Pollak, 2010). The
combined effects of these trends have led to increased competition for charitable
revenues in the sector and placed a larger emphasis for managers on the role of
foundation grantmaking as a percentage of overall charitable financial support.
While nonprofits as a whole depend on fees for services more than on charitable
giving, charitable contributions typically make up over 40 percent of total revenues in
subsectors such as the arts, environment, international, public and societal benefit, and
religious (Boris and Steuerle, 2006, 77). Around 90 percent of nonprofit managers report
using foundation grants as a funding source or actively soliciting foundation grants
(Blackbaud, 2010; Association of Fundraising Professionals, 2009). Meanwhile,
nonprofit subsectors that depend on charitable contributions in greater amounts have
shown the largest growth in the last decade (Wing, Roeger, and Pollak, 2010), placing an
even greater strain on charitable support.
Leaders in the grantmaking community have been concerned about growth in the
charitable nonprofit sector and increased competition for funding. Many grantmakers
view competition among similar nonprofits as a wasteful duplication of services (Cordes
& Rooney, 2004; Golden, 2001). At least anecdotally, foundations have responded to
greater competition by targeting more specific fields of interest, focusing their grants on
organizations with proven records of accomplishment and encouraging collaborative
projects (Chetkovich & Frumkin, 2003; Golden, 2001; Irvin, 2010). If true, this avoids
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spreading grants too thinly among similar service providers and decreases the risk of
losing charitable return on the donations, but it potentially stymies many small or newly
formed nonprofits in their efforts to grow their program operations. Such targeted
grantmaking could also contribute to a less ideologically diverse sector by affecting entry
and exit in nonprofit markets (Chetkovich & Frumkin, 2003). Already, foundations tend
to make grants to established and more financially secure organizations (Ashley and
Faulk, 2010), making it more difficult for smaller or transitioning organizations to receive
funding that could make them more financially stable and capable of serving their
missions. If greater competition for funding increases this pattern, greater segmentation
of the sector will occur, with established organizations garnering foundation funding and
foundations not funding many deserving charities. Since foundation funding could
professionalize, improve, or expand the services nonprofits provide, more selective
funding patterns in competitive environments could under-serve some segments of the
community.
Foundations become more selective in competitive grants markets for many
reasons. Like general donors, foundations are sensitive to the relative “price” of
donations, evaluated primarily through nonprofits’ financial efficiency measures (Ashley
and Faulk, 2010). Foundations are interested in the mission-related and broader social
impacts of their gifts and do not want to fund an organization that may go out of
existence in the near future. Financial benchmarking of potential grantees allows
foundations to assess the risk that organizations will not deliver on their promises. In this
way, grants are social “investments” rather than gifts, and foundation representatives
commonly evaluate them as they would financial investments. In the US, financial
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benchmarking also commonly takes place due to the availability of financial data from
yearly IRS 990 Form information returns for 501(c)(3) charitable nonprofits, the category
of nonprofits which foundations predominantly fund. Financial benchmarking generally
includes efficiency measures, such as program expense ratios (i.e., the proportion of total
expenses going to programs) and fundraising expense ratios (fundraising expenses as a
proportion of fundraising returns). Watchdog organizations such as the Wise Giving
Alliance commonly use these metrics, and general donors typically emphasize charitable
efficiency in their own giving choices (e.g., see http://www.bbb.org/us/CharityStandards/; Pallotta, 2010).
We know from previous research outlined in the literature review that financial
measures influence general donations. However, few empirical studies explain
foundation grant decisions specifically. Similarly, a small segment of the literature
suggests that competitive market pressures improve nonprofit financial efficiency. Yet,
no studies test a specific relationship between competition for grants and nonprofit
financial efficiency or the relative importance of financial efficiency across different
grant markets. Similar to for-profit competition, nonprofit competition could increase
efficiency through improved product quality and lower prices for nonprofit services, such
as through eliminating wasteful practices. Alternatively, competition could lead to
socially inefficient fundraising expenses as nonprofits vie for the same pool of funds,
limiting the overall impact that charitable resources have in communities.
From a general perspective on competition in the sector, the implications of
competition on nonprofit efficiency are important for taxpayers, policymakers, and
government actors. The government gives public charities tax exemptions and their
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donors tax deductions, thus subsidizing nonprofit activity. Therefore, the public and
government have an interest in the efficient operations of the nonprofit sector that
extends beyond foundations’ and donors’ concern with the efficiency of their grantees. If
competition leads foundations to disperse their funds more widely but in lower, less
effective grant amounts or if competition leads to inefficient fundraising, there would be
social costs to having duplicative service providers in nonprofit markets. In such cases,
federated fundraising campaigns in which nonprofits combine their resources to attract a
pool of funding which they then divide could achieve scale economies and be more
socially efficient than nonprofits spending more individually to get the same return
(Rose-Ackerman, 1982). Alternatively, competition among similar organizations could
increase efficiency by forcing competitors to develop innovative service delivery
practices and more efficient administration. Additionally, competition could lead to
greater efficiency by causing greater service differentiation and market segmentation as
individual nonprofits seek particular niches and capture unique funding streams (Barman,
2002; Chektovich and Frumkin, 2003; Rose-Ackerman, 1982).1
From a foundation perspective, if competition leads foundations to increasingly
select organizations with strong finances and proven records rather than spreading their
grants more thinly, individual foundations may be able to justify their grant decisions and
ensure the sustainable impact of their gifts. However, they may also inadvertently
contribute to an environment where nascent or innovative organizations fail and new
social demands go unmet. Because of the managerial emphasis on foundation funding

1

However, greater market segmentation could lead to monopoly-like behavior as specific firms capture
unique niches and funding streams.
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and because of the heavy costs of competing for foundation grants, foundations may
actually drive up administration costs and diminish nonprofit efficiency. Foundations
may simultaneously increase professionalism and organizational capacity as
organizations build their fundraising, tracking, and reporting operations. We currently
lack empirical evidence examining foundation impacts on these organizational behaviors.
In this dissertation, I examine these issues through three sets of research questions.
First, I explore how both the level of foundation presence and inter-organization
competition in local grants markets affects nonprofit financial behavior and efficiency. I
test how foundation influence and competition among grant-seeking nonprofits impact
organization (1) fundraising expenses, (2) administrative expenses, (3) fundraising
expense ratios, (4) program expense ratios, and (5) levels of revenue diversification. If
higher levels of foundation activity increase nonprofit administrative costs to manage
grant application, implementation and reporting processes, foundations could increase
organizational capacity but reduce program efficiency in these markets. Likewise,
regardless of foundation activity, if competition between similar nonprofits increases
fundraising expenses for the same pool of charitable funding, competition would generate
inefficiencies and social costs. However, competition could lead to social benefits. Lower
fundraising expenses and higher program expense ratios in more competitive markets
could indicate greater market segmentation and efficiency gains from more targeted
fundraising. Meanwhile, greater revenue portfolio diversification could indicate that
competition leads to greater nonprofit financial stability.
Second, I explore the impacts of nonprofit program expense ratios and
fundraising expenses on foundation grantmaking. I ask (1) whether the relative “prices”
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of donations to competing nonprofit organizations, represented by program expense
ratios, impact foundation grantmaking decisions and (2) how prices affect grantmaking
compared to the impact of nonprofit marketing, as demonstrated through fundraising
expenses. If foundations, like private donors, reward nonprofits with higher program
efficiency, foundations will create institutional pressures for nonprofits to be more
efficient in their program operations to maintain comparative advantages in the grants
marketplace. If foundations award grants to organizations with greater fundraising
expenses, however, greater marketing investments, instead of efficiency, would lead to
comparative advantages in these markets.
Finally, I examine whether greater competition in grants markets increases the
importance of (1) program expense ratios and (2) organization marketing behavior for
grant selection. If grant price sensitivity is stronger under greater competition,
competition could drive program efficiency. If fundraising expenses drive grant selection
in more competitive markets, foundation grantmaking may be more efficiently targeted in
these markets, but aggregate fundraising expenses by nonprofits competing for the same
grant pools could be socially inefficient.
Overall, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of organization and
foundation behavior in grant-seeking markets and competition’s role in the distribution of
charitable grants. Chapter 2 reviews the literature and pertinent theory. Chapter 3
develops theoretical arguments and research hypotheses for the research questions above.
I discuss the data and methodology in chapter 4, the findings in chapter 5, and the
conclusions and implications in chapter 6.

7

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Theory on the Existence of Nonprofits in Market Economies and its Relation to
Nonprofit Competition
The literature holds little consensus on what drives the formation and growth of
nonprofit organizations or how competition affects the sector. While a coherent body of
economic theory explains why and how for-profit firms operate in market economies,
nonprofit studies lack a similarly cogent framework for analyzing nonprofit
organizational behavior. Instead, several disparate theories propose explanations on the
existence of nonprofit organizations. Each comes from a different perspective of the role
of nonprofit organizations in society and contributes differently to how we may better
understand the nature of competition and collaboration among nonprofit organizations
and between nonprofits and other organizations in the economy.
Public goods theory, also called demand heterogeneity theory, argues that the
market and government do not meet the demand for collective, public, or quasi-public
goods. Nonprofits step in to supply undersupplied goods and services. Markets
undersupply goods and services because these goods are non-excludable or non-rival
(Steinberg, 2006). Since individuals cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of
these goods, they have little incentive to pay and a free-rider problem results.
Government can tax to overcome free-riding, but if the average or “median” voter does
not prefer the provision of a good or service, politicians will be unlikely to supply it
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because government resources and attention will be allocated toward providing goods
and services with greater voter demand (Steinberg, 2006; Anheier, 2005).
Therefore, nonprofits provide the undersupplied collective goods and services
through the private contributions and voluntary efforts of individuals who prefer or
demand higher levels of those goods. Even though the free-rider problem still exists and
nonprofits do not have the power to tax individuals, they can overcome free-riding
behavior through various fundraising strategies, creating private incentives for donating
to collective causes (Olson, 1965). Nonprofit organizations therefore step in to “meet a
diverse demand for collective goods” in democratic societies, from arts, education, and
healthcare to environmental protection and community development, providing goods
and services that would otherwise be underprovided by the market or government
(Weisbrod, 1988, 25).
Under the demand heterogeneity theory, nonprofits exist not to compete with
existing organizations but to fill in where collective goods and services are
undersupplied. This theory alone does not predict competition between nonprofits and
other organizations for clients or market niche. Instead, nonprofit competition should
center upon organizational resources, such as human capital, volunteers, and external
funding. However, individual nonprofits exist because enough people demand the
services they provide and are willing to support the organization through donations and
time. Therefore, nonprofit density in any market increases as new organizations attract
and maintain support from donors and volunteers who have similar preferences for goods
and services. Since the mix of demands and preferences in communities changes over
time, nonprofits will compete primarily with other nonprofit organizations for
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philanthropy. However, if demand for collective services increases and the government
decides to directly provide the services, nonprofits may begin to compete with
government agencies for funding or niche, and nonprofits may begin to compete with forprofit organizations for government contracts if government decides to indirectly supply
the services. In this way, an increase in demand for services that nonprofits provide and
the provision of those services by government “crowds out” some nonprofit activity
(Anheier, 2005, 123).
Weisbrod’s public goods or demand heterogeneity theory does not readily explain
the ongoing competition between nonprofit organizations and other organizations in the
same industries because the theory explains that nonprofits act more as gap fillers than
competitors. The market would clear over time as heterogeneous demands for collective
services are met, and particularly when demands for services increase, causing for-profit
and government suppliers to enter the market. Hansmann introduced a separate trustrelated or contract failure theory, however, that adds to Weisbrod’s theory and helps us
better understand ongoing competition and particularly why nonprofits would continue to
exist in service markets where for-profit organizations operate.
Hansmann argues that the free market undersupplies many goods and services
because of high levels of information asymmetry between the producers and consumers.
Third party payers have difficultly evaluating the quality of these goods and services,
such as daycare, hospital or nursing care, and therefore profit-seeking firms are likely to
cut service quality to increase profits (Anheier, 2005). Since the non-distribution
constraint prohibits nonprofit organizations from distributing residual income as profits to
stakeholders, nonprofit managers lack a profit incentive and are trusted to provide higher
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quality goods and services under scenarios of high information asymmetry between
buyers and sellers (Brown, 2010; Anheier, 2005). Under this theory, consumers, donors,
and government prefer nonprofits to for-profit organizations for services, donations, and
contracts.
Therefore, the trust or contract theory adds to the demand heterogeneity theory by
explaining why nonprofits compete with for-profit firms in supplying some goods and
services (Anheier, 2005). In addition to nonprofits competing among themselves for
general resources, nonprofits directly compete with for-profits for service markets and
government funding in some fields. Therefore, we expect nonprofits to push for-profit
providers out of particular market niches where high information asymmetry leads clients
and government to prefer nonprofit providers. However, both nonprofits and for-profits
will exist in industries where information asymmetries are not as high for clients who pay
for the services they directly receive, such as in healthcare and other segmented markets.
Therefore, even with comparative advantages in certain client markets, nonprofits will
continue to compete with for-profits in the same industry for human resources and for
client markets where information asymmetries are not as great, such as clients paying for
elective surgeries in the healthcare industry. This theory also helps us better understand
why government would choose to collaborate with nonprofit organizations for indirect
service provision through government grants or contract arrangements because nonprofits
would be trusted over for-profits to deliver on their promises that cannot be easily
monitored.
These theories originate from a demand-side perspective to explain how
nonprofits form to meet unmet demands. Supply-side theories, such as stakeholder and
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entrepreneurship theories, focus on the motivation of those who start nonprofits to
explain their existence. Like trust theory, stakeholder theory explains that nonprofit
organizations overcome information asymmetries where buyers do not trust for-profits to
provide goods and services at the quality level demanded (Anheier, 2005; Ben-Ner and
Van Hoomissen, 1993). However, stakeholder theory also acknowledges that, in some
cases, individuals prefer to provide the good they consume for themselves to ensure the
level of quality they want, to be the suppliers and demanders. This will be especially true
when particular groups demand a very specific level or quality of the good or service. For
instance, groups of parents with education preferences for their children that existing
schools do not provide may choose to form a cooperative school (Anheier, 2005) or an
independent charter school. Adding the supply-side perspective to the trust theory,
stakeholder theory improves our understanding of nonprofit competition by explaining
certain situations where nonprofits with similar missions will exist in the same
community or service market. Since these organizations will only differ based on
particular stakeholder preferences or ideology, competition between these nonprofits will
be high for external funding (such as foundation or government grants), human services,
clients, and market visibility.
Extending the supply-side argument for nonprofit organizations, entrepreneurship
theories (Young, 1983; Rose-Ackerman, 1996) argue that individuals who start and lead
nonprofits derive utility from non-monetary rewards of nonprofit work, either from
achieving the mission of the organization or from other motives, such as religious
motivation to serve others. Therefore, individuals or groups of individuals with
preferences to create their own organizations and approach social missions in unique
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ways drive the supply of nonprofit organizations. This explains why so many nonprofits
with similar services and missions exist. These theories predict a larger supply of
nonprofit organizations, and greater competition for funding, than public goods or trust
theories.
Interdependence theory argues that nonprofits and government complement each
other and that government largely supports the work done in the nonprofit sector through
grants, contracts, and public-private partnerships (Anheier, 2005). Based on this theory,
nonprofits can only provide a limited amount of services due to voluntary failure, or the
insufficiency of philanthropic resources to supply public goods under situations of
increasing demand. As public demand for their services grows, they increasingly rely on
government to fund and support their work, leading to competition between nonprofits
for valuable government grants and partnerships.
Overall, each of these major theories provides different insights into the nature of
nonprofit competition. As Anheier and Ben-Ner (1997) point out, these theories
complement more than contradict each other. Particularly by combining stakeholder and
entrepreneur perspectives with public goods and contract failure theory arguments, we
expect a greater supply of nonprofit organizations than can be supported (i.e., demanded)
by charitable donations. Because new and small nonprofits often rely solely or mostly on
donated volunteer time, we expect many more organizations than would be demanded by
financial resources to exist, especially in subsectors that have low barriers to entry, do not
require large physical or capital assets, or have high exit thresholds due to low operating
costs.
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Meanwhile, others argue that for-profit theory regarding competition and market
structure works for nonprofit organizations as well. Tuckman (1998) applies Porter's five
competitive forces to nonprofit competition and demonstrates how entry and exit, power
of buyers, power of suppliers, the presence of substitutes, and rivalry among competitors
similarly impacts nonprofit organizations, even in markets, such as donation or
foundation grant markets, where nonprofits compete exclusively against nonprofits.
Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006) characterize all nonprofits as for-profits with lower
costs due to tax subsidies and the altruistic motivation of their employees. They argue
that for-profit theory holds for nonprofits by treating them as for-profits with lower costs.
Extending this argument, Harrison and Laincz (2008) show consistency of for-profit
models in nonprofit industries.
Harrison and Laincz (2008) find a key difference for nonprofits, however,
showing much higher survival rates for nonprofit organizations than for-profits generally.
While new nonprofits form at around the same rate as for-profits, only 17 percent of
nonprofits fail after 10 years compared to 80 percent of for-profits (Harrison and Laincz,
2008). As Harrison and Laincz explain, this results in much higher net entry rates for
nonprofits than found in for-profits. This finding is consistent with Rose-Ackerman’s
(1982) argument that low nonprofit entry barriers will allow ideologically driven
entrepreneurs to start new organizations even in saturated markets. While new entrants
will attract new donors into markets through additional fundraising and marketing, each
organization’s share of overall donations will fall as the number of organizations in a
market rises (Rose-Ackerman, 1982). Therefore, high net entry rates in the nonprofit
sector translate into increased competition for donations over time.
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As voluntary organizations grow and professionalize, they capture more financial
resources in a charitable market. If they fill a particular niche providing a public good
that aligns with government initiatives, they may secure public funding to expand and
meet non-market demand for that good or service, as interdependence theory expects
(Anheier, 2005). Alternatively, they may fill a niche with a quasi-market good, such as in
the arts, and capture a mix of fees for service and private donations to expand their
operations. If their mission and services match foundation interests, foundation grants
will be a potential funding source. However, foundations have finite amounts of grant
money to dispense, and applications routinely far exceed their grantmaking capacity.
Therefore, foundation grants represent an instrumental source of funding, particularly for
nonprofit capacity building and growth due to the expertise and accountability that comes
with many grants, but foundations cannot fund all of the worthy organizations and causes
that saturate their applicant pools. As more nonprofits formalize, seek funding, and enter
the grants marketplace, competition becomes greater for individual grant awards.
2.2 The Role of Foundations in Nonprofit Professionalization and Financial
Behavior
Meanwhile, the level of foundation activity has both direct and indirect influences
on organizations in any given market. Under institutional theory, nonprofits respond to
their environment by conforming to industry or market standards and must behave more
similarly to other organizations and match normative expectations in their environment to
survive (DiMaggio & Powell, 1988; Feeney, 1997; Flood & Fennel, 1995; Guo and Acar,
2005; Kerlin and Pollak, 2010; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Milofsky & Hunter 1994; Rao,
1998; Scott, 1995). For nonprofits, institutional pressures come in large part from
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external stakeholders such as donors and foundations (Krashinsky, 1997). Like other
nonprofits, foundations have unique missions they try to accomplish. While some, such
as operating foundations, choose to supply their own services or specifically fund one
particular organization to accomplish their goals, most grantmaking foundations choose
to outsource services to accomplish their objectives instead of providing the services
themselves. In this sense, foundations buy services from nonprofits. By outsourcing,
foundations reduce their transactions costs in approaching the complex and dynamic
problems represented in their missions, which would require large, complex
organizational structures if they were to perform the services themselves (Coase, 1937).
Using this strategy, foundations also remain flexible in how they respond to public
problems and can adapt their funding priorities as new demands emerge. However, as
third-party buyers, foundations purchase services for clients other than themselves and
must deal with the oversight problems explained by contract failure theory. Due to the
complexity of fully evaluating the quality of services purchased, foundations rely on
signals of organizational quality when selecting grantees (Bielefeld, 1992; Feigenbaum,
1987). Organizations use fundraising campaigns as a marketing tool, in part to build
organizational legitimacy and signal the quality of their services to potential funders
(Chetkovich and Frumkin, 2003; Steinberg, 1997), and greater foundation activity in any
given market increases the importance of fundraising for prospective grantees to maintain
a competitive edge.
Foundations also operate in institutionalized environments and, in particular, are
subject to public scrutiny due to their tax advantages. Because of this, foundations must
also legitimize themselves by formalizing their grant selection process and demonstrating
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the stewardship of their funds. This has led to additional demands on organizational
actors in their environment to develop professional administrative practices to monitor
and measure the quality of their services and demonstrate their mission impact through
formal reporting (Froelich, 1999). In this way, foundations contribute to an institutional
environment that stresses more professional and corporate rather than volunteer and
altruistic behavior (Dolnicar, Irvine, and Lacarevski, 2008). With the growth of the sector
and the growth of institutionalized philanthropy, the grant writing and reporting process
has become professionalized, adding to nonprofit administrative complexity (Dolnicar,
Irvine, and Lacarevski, 2008). In 2004, foundation grantees spent an average of 29 hours
on each grant proposal and 62 hours on managing each grant, and grantees that received
over $1 million spent over 200 hours on each proposal alone (Bolduc, Buchanan, and
Huang, 2004).
With the goal of increasing the quality of services provided, foundations will
pressure grantees to develop professional practices beyond the administration of their
grants (Froelich, 1999), such as undertaking strategic planning and program evaluation.
As buyers of nonprofit services, foundations will have more influence over nonprofits the
more active they are (i.e., the more grants they administer) in a market (Tuckman, 1998).
Through resource dependence, the more active foundations are in a market, the closer the
inter-organizational connections between foundations and nonprofits, and the stronger the
influence on nonprofit professionalization (Bielefeld, 1992; Froelich, 1999). Because of
institutional pressure, prospective grantees will mimic successful organizations in their
market environment (Bielefeld, 1992; DiMaggio and Powell, 1988) that have the closest
ties to foundations. Therefore, even organizations that do not receive foundation funding
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will develop their professional practices through mimetic isomorphism as foundation
activity in a market increases.
Therefore, through institutional and resource dependence pressures and
institutional isomorphism, greater foundation activity in a nonprofit market will cause
greater professionalization of administrative and fundraising operations. This will result
in higher administrative and fundraising expenses in markets with greater foundation
influence. While these expectations come from the literature cited above, previous studies
have not empirically tested the association between foundation activity and nonprofit
expenses.
2.3 Inter-Organization Competition and Nonprofit Finance Behavior
A few empirical studies examine the impact of inter-organization competition on
nonprofit administrative expenses and fundraising behavior (see Bilodeau & Slivinski,
1997; Castaneda et al, 2008; Feigenbaum, 1987; Seaman, 2004; Thornton, 2006). These
studies find that competition for publicity or charitable donations among similar
nonprofits causes organizations, at least in aggregate, to increase spending on fundraising
or marketing, leading to less efficient fundraising (Castaneda et al, 2008; Feigenbaum,
1987; Irvin, 2010; Seaman, 2004; Thornton, 2006).2 Meanwhile, competition leads to
lower administrative expenses as nonprofits deal with resource constraints and seek

2

Thornton (2006) finds that increased competition between organizations causes individual nonprofits to
decrease their fundraising expenses at a decreasing rate, even though additional organizations generate
higher aggregate fundraising expenses. New organizations were expected to add fundraising expenses at a
higher rate than existing firms reduce them, leading to higher aggregate fundraising expenses. Other studies
argue for increases in fundraising expenditures from increased competition (Barman, 2002; Castaneda et al,
2008; Feigenbaum, 1987; Rose-Ackerman, 1982; Steinberg, 1987; Tuckman, 1998).
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competitive advantages with program efficiency (Castaneda et al, 2008; Feigenbaum,
1987; Thornton, 2006).
In contrast to for-profit analysis in which the economic theory of the firm assumes
profit-maximizing behavior, nonprofits operate in mixed industries with no one model of
objective behavior (Hughes and Luksetich, 2010). Nonprofit objectives may be servicemaximizing or budget-maximizing (Steinberg, 1989). Service-maximizing managers
strive to improve overall program efficiency while maintaining high levels of quality or
quantity of goods and services. Budget-maximizing managers, on the other hand may still
emphasize providing a high level of quantity and quality, but they increase the total
budget to maximize their own salaries and benefits, leading to wasteful management
(Hughes and Luksetich, 2010; Steinberg, 1989). Like for-profits, nonprofits suffer from
agency problems in which managers may budget-maximize even though directors
emphasize service-maximizing (Hughes and Luksetich, 2010). Under monopoly
conditions, managers will more easily budget-maximize, potentially wastefully increasing
their own budget, but competitive environments will constrain managers to service
maximize in order to maintain a competitive edge and survive, leading to greater program
efficiency (Feigenbaum, 1987; Hughes and Luksetich, 2010)
Other studies point out that even with greater fundraising expenses, increased
competition generates efficient aggregate outcomes in the sector, in addition to
administrative efficiency. For example, faced with competition from similar
organizations, nonprofits may opt to differentiate the services they provide, segmenting
the market into more socially efficient sections (Chetkovich and Frumkin, 2003;
Gronbjerg, 1993; Han, 1994; Hannan and Freeman, 1977 cited in Barman, 2002).
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Alternatively, organizations may develop relationships with institutional funders or
collaborations with other organizations to attract greater funding exposure, which would
also produce more socially efficient uses of limited charitable resources (Barman, 2002;
Combs & Ketchen, 1999).
Strong resource dependence pressures also exist in nonprofit markets. As
discussed in chapter 1, many nonprofits in donation-reliant fields depend on foundation
grants. This dependence makes organizations willing to change their behavior, programs,
and even missions to remain competitive and secure foundation grants, causing them to
seek a particular mission or program niche to differentiate themselves from competing
firms (Barman, 2002). Due to these resource dependence relationships, foundations and
other donors oversee their grantees in a rational and efficiency-driven way (Bielefeld,
1992). Donors and funders will be price-sensitive in competitive environments and prefer
program efficiency, as measured by the ratio of program expenses to total expenses
(Barman, 2002; Bielefeld, 1992; Chetkovich and Frumkin, 2003; Rose-Ackerman, 1982).
Nonprofits in more highly competitive environments will demonstrate greater program
efficiency as they compete for comparative advantages and respond to competitive
pressures. Similar to for-profit markets, the presence of substitutes in nonprofit markets
will influence market share, price and output, with greater competition between substitute
organizations driving output up and prices (i.e., inefficiency) down (Tuckman, 1998).
However, competition will also cause organizations to spend more on fundraising
to market themselves and to gain or maintain legitimacy (Bielefeld, 1992; Chetkovich
and Frumkin, 2003; Steinberg, 1997). Over time, this process will lead to greater
differentiation and market segmentation of similar service providers, more overall
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efficiency in service markets, and a better fit between funders and organizations through
more targeted fundraising and donor selection (Barman, 2002; Chetkovich and Frumkin,
2003; Rose-Ackerman, 1982). However, even nonprofits that narrowly target foundations
by their mission fit will experience high levels of funding uncertainty in competitive
markets. This uncertainty will cause nonprofits to attempt to differentiate themselves
further through marketing appeals to signal quality to potential funders and develop a
general trust of the quality of their services in the community (Feigenbaum, 1987).
Larger organizations and more successful fundraisers should be able to capitalize on
economies of scope, using the same resources to serve multiple functions and thereby
temper their fundraising costs (Feigenbaum, 1987). Funders’ price sensitivity will help
successful organizations capture greater shares of market resources, but it will lead to
more difficulty for nonprofits that already have a difficult time as they demonstrate lower
fundraising efficiency and receive less donations as a result (Rose-Ackerman, 1992).
Overall, even though new entrants will bring in a limited amount of additional donors,
competition may lead to less efficient levels of fundraising on average as organizations
continue to compete for declining shares of overall grants (Rose-Ackerman, 1982;
Thornton, 2006).
Additionally, in order to compensate for greater resource uncertainty from funders
and lower shares of overall philanthropy, nonprofits in more competitive environments
will generate or increase other revenue streams, such as commercial sales to crosssubsidize charitable activities (James, 1983; Weisbrod, 1998). Due to greater funding
uncertainty, nonprofits will ensure more financial stability over time by diversifying their
income portfolio (Tuckman and Chang, 1991). Competition for philanthropic sources will
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therefore be associated with greater revenue source differentiation in nonprofit markets
(Alexander, 1998; Gronbjerg, 1993; Powell & Friedkin, 1987 cited in Barman, 2002;
Weisbrod, 1998) as organizations find alternatives to charitable resource dependence.
Overall, competition yields several potential benefits in charitable nonprofit
markets. Even though competition will encourage greater fundraising expenses,
competitive markets will be more efficient due to less wasteful spending and more
targeted nonprofit-foundation relationships. They will also be more stable due to greater
revenue diversification within organizations in the market. However, market
segmentation within competitive markets will lead to greater bifurcation between
successful and stifled organizations and to less ideologically diverse service providers
over time (Chetkovich and Frumkin, 2003; Rose-Ackerman, 1982).
2.4 Contract Failure and Foundation Grant Selection
The few studies that empirically investigate competition in the sector model the
effect of competition on nonprofit, rather than donor or grantor, behavior. Below, I draw
on nonprofit theory and grantmaking studies more generally to develop hypotheses to test
organizational determinants of foundation grantmaking and to develop models to test
competition’s moderating impact on foundation behavior, which is explained in the
following sections.
Previous research highlights the lack of information on foundation decisionmaking. Foundations differ by type and structure, and decision-making criteria and the
formality of the decision-making process (Gronbjerg, Martell, and Paarlberg, 2000). In
general, foundations base their decisions on applicants’ geographic location and mission,
financial reports, program performance, reputation and connection to each foundation
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(Gronbjerg, Martell, and Paarlberg, 2000). Complicating the evaluation of foundation
decision-making, foundation boards do not always operate very effectively. Board
members are generally volunteers who do not hold rights to residual profits and pay high
information and transaction costs to actively participate in each board decision
(Speckbacher, 2008). Incongruity among board members’ individual value assessments
of decision alternatives (e.g., potential grantees in the case of foundation boards) creates
transaction costs through negotiations, and individual board members therefore
frequently opt to abstain from active negotiation, free riding on others’ assessments
(Speckbacher, 2008). Information asymmetries between grant applicants and foundation
decision-makers further complicate the effectiveness of foundation due diligence.
As donors, foundations are third-party payers for services they cannot easily
evaluate due to information asymmetries explained by contract failure theory (Hansmann,
1980, 1987; Easley and O’Hara, 1986; Krashinsky, 1986, 1997). Foundation agents
therefore rely on signals to judge the quality of services provided by grant applicants
(Bielefeld, 1992; Feigenbaum, 1987). As mentioned in section 2.2, nonprofit fundraising
activity will signal legitimacy and quality to foundations, and organizations with greater
marketing, as reflected in fundraising expenses, will receive greater foundation funding.
Since foundation decision-makers tend to come from business backgrounds, they will
also emphasize more easily measured financial performance metrics rather than elusive
social returns (Deep and Frumkin, 2006; Sansing, 2010). Like other donors, they are
influenced by the approval of outside evaluators, such as the government granting and
enforcing 501(c)(3) recognition or nonprofit charity watchdog groups, which also
emphasize financial metrics. In this way, they will tend to make decisions on grants
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similarly to individual donors (Gronbjerg, Martell, and Paarlberg, 2000). Just as these
external evaluators do, foundation agents will directly scrutinize nonprofits’ financial
efficiency signals, as reported by charities on their Form 990 information returns, to
determine the relative “price” of donating to each organization. Foundations will also rely
on powerful signaling effects of other foundations, increasing the likelihood that the same
organizations will receive multiple grants from various foundations.
On top of all of this, foundations, like other nonprofits, have unique missions and
compete with one another for visibility. Foundations identify as liberal, conservative, or
centrist, (Fleishman, 2007), and they compete for general awareness and policy saliency
of the causes they represent. Foundations also differ by objective function and strategy
(Anheier and Daly, 2007; Frumkin, 2006; Leat, 1999; Young, 2001). While altruism, a
desire to give back, and a drive for creating lasting social change motivate foundation
leaders and funders, self-serving objectives such as gaining community recognition for
their goodwill, marketing their brand, or overcoming negative public images also
influence them (Fleishman, 2007). While corporations’ giving is particularly strategic and
correlated with their own level of marketing and competition (Zhang et al, 2009), other
forms of foundations are not immune to these self-serving objectives. Even community
foundations face competitive pressures from other philanthropic vehicles, such as forprofit donor advised funds, and have to spend more to market themselves to donors in
more competitive climates (Graddy and Morgan, 2006). In this way, however, by serving
themselves and increasing their brand recognition, and sales in the case of corporations,
they also serve their charitable missions by increasing their philanthropic funding and the
broader public awareness impacts of their work.
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Because of the importance of their own image and impact in a community
through their grants, foundations tend to highlight the stewardship of their resources,
even though they face limited accountability and oversight themselves (Fleishman, 2007).
Foundations demonstrate their social benefits through the success of their grantees, even
though program success is difficult to measure (Center for Effective Philanthropy, 2002).
Therefore, foundations can improve their success and image, by focusing their grants on
more established organizations with proven records (Fleishman, 2007; Gronbjerg et al,
2000).
Foundation decision-making is not always rational. While a rational actor model
is useful to analyze foundation behavior, decisions are not always top-down, internal
actors may not agree on decisions, and full information on any grant decision is rare
(Diaz, 1999). Instead, a bounded rationality model is more fitting in which foundation
decision-makers face transactions costs and limited information during grantee selection
(Diaz, 1999). Funding decisions depend on objective criteria, such as geographic
location, mission fit, and performance indicators (Gronbjerg et al, 2000). However, with
greater numbers of grant applicants, foundations face a more difficult decision process
and tend to rely heavier on reputation and objective measures, requiring more
information in the grant application (Gronbjerg et al, 2000).
2.5 Financial Efficiency Measures and the Relative “Price” of Donations
Public demand for financial accountability and transparency by nonprofit
organizations has been an issue for over three decades (Smallwood and Levis 1977;
Frumkin and Kim 2001; Tinkelman and Mankaney 2007). However, more recent
scandals in the 1990s and early 2000s, along with for-profit corporate scandals and policy
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responses like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have caused increased scrutiny of the field
(Frumkin and Kim 2001; Tinkelman and Mankaney 2007). This scrutiny has led to the
development of public and private financial monitoring mechanisms of nonprofits’
financial reporting, primarily relying on data from the annual IRS Form 990 filings and
expense ratios using these reported figures. Generally, financial stewardship oversight
using such data has focused on ratios of fundraising expenses to fundraising revenues and
of administrative expenses to total expenses.
Over 30 states have charitable solicitation acts that regulate charities’ fundraising
(Hopkins 2002, 2005). Although the laws vary state-to-state, they generally provide the
legal framework for fundraisers and attempt to limit abuse of charitable intent. Many
implicitly or explicitly cap charities’ fundraising cost ratio at a legal ratio, typically 25 to
35 percent (Smallwood and Levis, 1977; Hopkins, 2002).
Critics, however, argue that accounting practices within organizations bias
fundraising and program efficiency measures (Smallwood and Levis, 1977; Hopkins,
2002). As Hopkins (2002) explains, nonprofit managers do not all calculate the numbers
the same way, especially since many are not formally trained in accounting. Due to
reporting discrepancies, one organization may report a 20 percent fundraising ratio and
another may report only a 15 percent ratio when both have equal efficiency or the
organization reporting the higher ratio may really be more efficiently managed (Hopkins
2002, p. 189).
Additionally, many organizations inaccurately report their administrative and
fundraising expenses, perhaps intentionally. The Urban Institute and the Center on
Philanthropy at Indiana University Overhead Costs Project (2004) examined the
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reliability of IRS Form 990 data on nonprofits’ overhead expenses, including fundraising
costs and administrative expenses. Incredibly, close to 40 percent of nonprofits reporting
$50,000 or more in contributions reported zero fundraising costs (Urban Institute and the
Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University 2004). Misreporting fundraising as zero
derives from pressure on managers to demonstrate greater efficiency and leads to validity
issues with efficiency measures (Krishnan, Yetman, and Yetman, 2006). However,
organizations that report reasonable fundraising expenses and those that use outside
accountants are more likely to accurately report their expenses, based on comparisons
with external audits (Krishnan, Yetman, and Yetman 2006; Tinkelman and Mankaney,
2007).
Even when accurately reported, however, financial efficiency measures can
mislead potential donors because they represent past average performance rather than
current marginal performance (Steinberg, 1986; 1989; Brooks, 2006; Pallotta, 2010).
More complete information on the incremental impact of a donor’s particular gift would
be more valuable for individual donor decision-making, even though average efficiency
remains important for taxpayers as a whole and policymakers (Steinberg, 1989).
Moreover, as Hager and Greenlee (2004) point out, an important shortcoming of financial
performance measures is that they do not directly measure mission performance or
program effectiveness. The exact relationship between financial and mission performance
measures is unknown. Financial measures may be poor indicators of program
effectiveness, or they may be highly correlated with mission performance (or somewhere
in between).
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Despite these arguments against using fundraising and program cost ratios to
compare nonprofit organizations, policymakers and watchdog organizations use these
financial efficiency measures among the other indicators of nonprofit performance. For
example, the Better Business Bureau’s Wise Giving Alliance uses a strict threshold of
35% to judge whether organizations fall within its standard for fundraising efficiency
(www.give.org/standards/newcbbbstds.asp). Charity Navigator also uses the fundraising
ratio in its standards, endorsing organizations that have greater fundraising efficiency (for
example, they list organizations receiving their top score of four stars at
www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=search.results&overallrtg=4). As commonly
noted, these measures are very easy to calculate and understand. Furthermore, the
financial metrics can be measured and evaluated uniformly across organizations with
different missions – something impossible to do using mission performance criteria.
Especially with the rise of online giving and the use the internet to support donor
decisions, donors are becoming more aware, and critical, of financial efficiency measures
in nonprofits. It is clear from popular websites such as BBB Wise Giving Alliance
(give.org), American Institute of Philanthropy (charitywatch.org), and Charity Navigator
(charitynavigator.org), that efficiency, accountability, and stewardship of donative funds
are important factors for donors when making funding decisions. Indeed, donors reward
nonprofit organizations that report higher financial efficiency in terms of spending
greater proportions of their total expenses on program services than fundraising and
administrative costs (Buchheit & Parsons, 2006; Callen & Falk, 1993; Greenlee &
Brown, 1999; Jacobs & Marudas, 2009; Okten & Weisbrod, 2000; Posnett & Sandler,
1989; Tinkelman & Mankaney, 2007; Weisbrod & Dominguez, 1986).
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Donors favor financially efficient organizations for multiple reasons. Buchheit
and Parsons (2006) and Parsons (2003) use an experimental design randomly assigning
potential donors to groups in which financial efficiency information was and was not
revealed. Both studies find that reporting financial efficiency signals trustworthiness and
is significantly related to participants’ willingness to donate to an organization.
Several studies using IRS form 990 data find significant, positive relationships
between greater program expense ratios (program or administrative efficiency) and
charitable donations (Jacobs & Marudas, 2009; Okten & Weisbrod, 2000; Posnett &
Sandler, 1989; Kingma, 1989; Khanna, Posnett & Sandler, 1995; Khanna & Sandler,
2000). Meanwhile, Frumkin and Kim (2001) and Greenlee and Brown (1999) use similar
methods, variables, and data and find insignificant or mixed impacts of organizations’
program and administrative efficiency on contributions.
However, Tinkelman & Mankaney (2007) replicate the Frumkin and Kim (2001)
and Greenlee and Brown (1999) models with NCCS Core Data files on all IRS Form 990
filers in the place of Statistics of Income (SOI) data that they argue are not representative
of donation-seeking nonprofit organizations. They find that making these adjustments,
controlling for factors from other studies, and reducing the sample to organizations for
which donations make up significant portions of their revenues produce significant,
positive effects of higher program expense ratios on contributions.
Other studies have focused on clarifying the relationship between financial
variables and concepts of organizational efficiency and donations performance. Trussel
and Parsons (2003) and Ritchie and Kolodinsky (2003) use factor analyses to determine
which financial reporting ratios from the Form 990 data load on concepts of program and
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fundraising efficiency and other factors related to predicting donations to charitable
nonprofit organizations. Ritchie and Kolodinsky (2003) find that separate factors of
fundraising efficiency (e.g., direct contributions divided fundraising expenses), public
support (e.g., total contributions divided by total revenue), and fiscal performance (e.g.,
total contributions divided by total expenses) demonstrate financial performance in
nonprofit organizations. Trussel and Parsons (2003) meanwhile include more diverse
efficiency variables in their analysis, such as program expense ratios (program to total
expenses) and administrative cost ratios (administrative to total expenses). Contrary to
Ritchie and Kolokinsky (2003), Trussel and Parsons (2003) find that variables for
fundraising efficiency load with a variable of fundraising expenses on a factor they
describe as fundraising quantity while program and administrative efficiency load on a
factor of program efficiency. Trussel & Parsons also demonstrate that measures of
administrative efficiency load with program efficiency rather than on a factor of
organizational stability represented by financial health variables, as Tuckman and Chang
(1991) assume. Overall, Trussel and Parsons (2003) find that controlling for factors of
financial health, fundraising expenses, and organizational size and age, allocating greater
proportions of total expenses to administration and fundraising rather than to programs
has a significant, negative impact on expected donations. A factor measuring fundraising
expenses has a significant positive effect on donations, controlling for the other factors.
2.6 The Overall View of Nonprofit Grant Markets
Two main actors operate in the foundation grant marketplace: nonprofit
managers and foundation decision-makers. Nonprofit managers strive to win
grants that foundation actors give. The markets are fragmented by geographic
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location and service industries, in which relatively few foundations serve each
grant market. Because of the low numbers of foundations relative to nonprofits
and since nonprofit managers tend to emphasize foundation grants as an important
part of their fundraising (Blackbaud, 2010; Boldoc et al, 2004), grant markets are
essentially monosponistic where few foundations, as buyers of nonprofit services,
hold large amounts of influence on nonprofit managers (Tuckman, 1998). Even
small levels of foundation activity in a market can therefore have large impacts on
nonprofit management, causing managers to professionalize and increase their
administrative and fundraising capacity to capture and manage grants.
Under greater levels of competition for grants, nonprofit managers can (1)
increase their spending on fundraising to market themselves more heavily, (2) try
to appeal to funders with comparative program efficiency through finding greater
operational efficiency, or (3) look for alternative revenue sources (Barman, 2002;
Alexander, 1998; Bielefeld, 1992; Chetkovich and Frumkin, 2003; Steinberg,
1997; Weisbrod, 1998). Similar to for-profits, substitutes in the market will drive
organizations toward greater program efficiency, in part through resource
constraints and in part to seek competitive advantages over their peers (Castaneda
et al, 2008; Feigenbaum, 1987; Thornton, 2006; Tuckman, 1998). However,
facing greater competition, organizations will spend more on fundraising to
increase their marketing and perceived legitimacy to potential funders (Bielefeld,
1992; Chetkovich and Frumkin, 2003; Steinberg, 1997). Managers will also
generate more diverse funding portfolios to cross-subsidize their charitable
activity and compensate for less grant certainty (James, 1983; Weisbrod, 1998).
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As third-party buyers of services and due to the information asymmetries
inherent in nonprofit service provision, foundations have trouble directly
measuring the quality of potential grantees (Hansmann, 1980, 1987; Easley and
O’Hara, 1986; Krashinsky, 1986, 1997). Foundations will therefore rely on
objective signals of quality, including program efficiency, size, and fundraising
appeals, to guide their grant decisions (Bielefeld, 1992; Deep and Frumkin, 2006;
Feigenbaum, 1987; Gronbjerg et al, 2000; Sansing, 2010). In more competitive
markets where foundations decide among greater numbers of applicants,
foundations’ cost to fully evaluate each applicant increases, and foundations both
require more information in the grant application and rely to a greater extent on
easily observed signals of organizational quality (Gronbjerg et al, 2000). In
competitive environments, it will be more difficult for the average organization to
win a grant, and organizations with greater program efficiency and fundraising
expenses will hold stronger competitive advantages over their peers.
In the next chapter, I develop specific hypotheses to test each of these
expectations.
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CHAPTER 3
INTEGRATED THEORY, HYPOTHESES, AND MODELS

3.1 The Influence of Foundation Activity on Nonprofit Financial Behavior
Nonprofit markets vary in terms of the number of foundations funding
organizations and the total grant amounts dispersed. As third party buyers, foundations
require grantees to monitor and formally report their activities to evaluate the services
they purchase. Foundation grant proposals and grant management therefore create
administrative burdens, leading nonprofits to professionalize their fundraising and
administrative practices in order to successfully secure and maintain foundation funding.
More formalized and advanced fundraising practices will market nonprofit organizations
to their external stakeholders, including foundations, and signal legitimacy in these
markets. Because other nonprofits will mimic successful nonprofits to demonstrate
legitimacy, survive, and compete in the market, foundation activity will lead to the
professionalization of all nonprofits in the markets in which they are active. Nonprofits
will therefore spend more on administrative and fundraising in markets with higher
foundation activity.
H1a: Greater foundation activity in nonprofit subsector and geographic markets
will lead to greater average nonprofit fundraising expenses in those markets.
Foundation Activity

+

Fundraising Expenses

H1b: Greater foundation activity in nonprofit subsector and geographic markets
will lead to greater average nonprofit administrative expenses in those markets.
Foundation Activity

+

33

Administrative Expenses

3.2 The Impacts of Competition on Nonprofit Financial Behavior
Based on the theory explaining the existence of nonprofit organizations in market
economies explained in chapter 2, particularly stakeholder and entrepreneur theories, a
greater supply of nonprofit organizations in particular service markets will exist than can
likely be supported at efficient levels by donor and foundation funding alone. Since more
nonprofits will compete in foundation grants markets than can likely be funded,
foundations will be more selective of nonprofits in more competitive markets. This will
lead to lower probabilities of getting foundation grants for nonprofit managers.
Nonprofits will increase their fundraising expenses as they compete for funding and use
fundraising to market their services, increase their reputation and legitimacy, and earn a
competitive edge in the grants marketplace.
H2a: Greater competition among grant-seeking nonprofits will lead to greater
average nonprofit fundraising expenses.
Competition

+

Fundraising Expenses

However, due to greater uncertainty for individual grants and more demanding
selection criteria on the part of foundations, increased competition will lead to lower
average returns on fundraising and less fundraising efficiency overall. Feigenbaum
(1987) finds evidence of this with charity hospitals, and Thornton (2006) finds this effect
in general competition for general donations. In his study, Thornton (2006) compares
these results to similar findings in marketing studies. Seaman (2004) also discusses this
general finding in the arts in his review of nonprofit arts marketing studies.
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H2b: Greater competition among grant-seeking nonprofits will lead to lower
average fundraising efficiency.
Competition

-

Fundraising Efficiency

Increased competition for foundation grants will also lead to other firm behavior
in order to maintain consistent levels of overall funding in the face of increased
competition for donations or to compensate for decreased foundation funding due to
increased competition for this limited pool of resources. Under institutional theory,
nonprofits respond to their environment by conforming to industry or market standards
and must behave more similarly to other organizations and match normative expectations
in their environment to survive (DiMaggio & Powell, 1988; Feeney, 1997; Flood &
Fennel, 1995; Guo and Acar, 2005; Kerlin and Pollak, 2010; Meyer & Rowan, 1977;
Milofsky & Hunter 1994; Rao, 1998; Scott, 1995). Because donors and funders hold
strong preferences for nonprofit program efficiency, nonprofits in grant-seeking markets
will experience greater institutional pressures to allocate more spending on programs in
order to continue to receive grants in more competitive markets. In other words, in order
to remain competitive and to maintain levels of foundation funding, when competition for
finite resources exists, is introduced, or grows, organizations will actively pursue
desirability in terms of objective ratios of efficiency, such as the proportion of revenue
expended on services rather than administration (Barman, 2002, 1194). Nonprofit
managers may achieve this through manipulating their accounting practices (Krishnan,
Yetman and Yetman, 2006), but they may also achieve greater operational efficiency
through better management practices and finding cost savings through more efficient
administration when faced with greater competition.
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Feigenbaum (1987) finds that competition leads to greater operational efficiency
in charity hospitals, and Thornton (2006) also suggests that competition will lead donors
to become more selective of efficient nonprofits and, therefore, add strong external
institutional pressures on nonprofits to be more efficient. Bilodeau and Slivinski (1997)
similarly argue that greater inter-firm competition increases the level of nonprofits’
efficiency as donors select more efficient firms under situations of higher interorganization competition for their donations.3 Overall, these institutional pressures will
lead organizations to allocate greater shares of expenses to programs rather than
administration.
H2c: Greater competition among grant-seeking nonprofits will lead to higher
average firm reported program efficiency.
Competition

+

Program Efficiency

However, in order to compensate for lower likelihoods of funding given increased
competition for foundation funds, in addition to trying to be more competitive, nonprofits
will seek alternative sources of revenue. Competition for philanthropic sources will
therefore lead to revenue source differentiation (Weisbrod, 1998; Alexander, 1998;
Gronbjerg, 1993; Powell & Friedkin, 1987 cited in Barman, 2002) as an alternative to
charitable resource dependence.

3

Although their study is in the context of higher levels of donor-advised funding through federated giving
programs such as the United Way, and they further explain that high proportions of undesignated funds in
such scenarios may actually undermine or hide the efficiency effect of competition by allowing federated
programs to balance funding across organizations by subsidizing inefficient firms with undesignated
donations.
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H2d: Greater competition among grant-seeking nonprofits will lead to lower
average firm revenue concentration.
Competition

-

Revenue Concentration

3.3 Foundation Grant Decision Hypotheses
In all, the findings across the studies cited in section 2.5 above provide robust
support for several hypotheses in the context of this paper about the expected effect
nonprofits’ reported program efficiency and raw fundraising expenditures have on
donations. However, despite the substantial replication of these findings in the context of
private charitable donations, there are several shortcomings in previous research with
regard to discerning institutionalized foundation grant-making behavior. Primarily,
previous studies use a measure of contributions developed from Form 990 data that
combines donations from individuals, government and foundations.
Therefore, inferences regarding foundation grant-making behavior may be biased by the
effects of general contributions if foundation grants are not analyzed separately from
aggregated contributions. Therefore, instead of assuming the relationships found in
previous studies on general donor behavior hold for predicting grant-making behavior, I
test these relationships for foundation grantmaking decisions in this analysis.
Based on the theory outlined, foundation grantmakers emphasize financial
efficiency measures, all else equal, when selecting grantees because of the lower relative
“price” of grant donations to organizations that spend relatively more on programs than
administration.
H3a, b, c: Greater program efficiency, measured as allocating greater proportions
of total expenses to programs rather than to administration or fundraising, will
make organizations more likely to receive foundation grants.
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Program Efficiency

+

Grants (a) Likelihood, (b) Number, and (c) Amount

Also, given competition for marketing and fundraising efforts between nonprofits,
nonprofits that spend more money on fundraising, all else equal, are more likely to gain
exposure to foundations in the marketplace and signal higher quality and fit to those
foundations through increased fundraising appeals. Therefore, nonprofits that spend more
on fundraising will be more likely to receive foundation grants.
H3d, e, f: Greater fundraising expenditures will make organizations more likely to
receive foundation grants.
+

Fundraising Expenses

Grants (d) Likelihood, (e) Number, and (f) Amount

Additionally, organization size serves as another signal of quality to foundations.
All else equal, large organizations represent stable philanthropic investments since these
organizations have likely grown through their own success. Larger organizations also
likely have more established and efficient grant-writing units and benefit from economies
of scale in their fundraising operations (Feigenbaum, 1987). Under competition between
grant-seeking nonprofits, organization size is a comparative advantage. Size will
therefore have a positive impact on receiving foundation grants in competitive grants
markets.
H3g, h, i: Greater organizational size will make organizations more likely to
receive a foundation grant.
Organizational Size

+

Grants (g) Likelihood, (h) Number, and (i) Amount
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3.4 Hypotheses on the Moderating Impact of Competition on Grant Selection
Previous studies have not modeled the effect of competition among nonprofits on
donor decision-making. Even though the literature on nonprofit competition in the section
on organization behavior above discusses the nonprofit firm response to increased
competition for fundraising or marketing, little can be inferred about the impact
competition has on donor behavior. The closest finding approaching this research
question is Thornton’s (2006) finding that, on average, returns on fundraising
expenditures decrease with greater competition suggests that donors spread their gifts
more thinly in more competitive nonprofit markets.
However, in the case of the market for foundation grants, outcomes are primarily
binary in terms of organizations being awarded a grant (1) or not (0). To test whether a
population of foundations indeed spreads grants evenly to competing nonprofits in
foundation grant-seeking markets, I test whether nonprofits in industry subsectors with
greater inter-organization competition are significantly less likely to receive a grant.
Under this hypothesis, a null relationship will tentatively support foundations dispersing
their grants thinly among competing nonprofits, while a negative relationship will
conversely provide support to inferring that grantmakers are more selective in their
grantmaking in scenarios of greater competition between similar organizations.
H4a: Greater inter-organization competition for foundation funding will lead to
lower likelihood for organizations to receive a foundation grant, on average.
Competition

-

Likelihood of Receiving a Grant

As Barman (2002) notes, the literature generally expects inter-organization
competition to cause external evaluators to focus on efficiency (also see Powell, 1991,
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184; Orru, Biggart & Hamilton, 1991). However, there remains a void in the empirical
literature on “the impact of competition on the perceptions of environmental actors” in
the nonprofit context (Barman, 2002, 1196, 1216). Empirical studies in the context of forprofit organizations or mixed industries with competition between for-profits and
nonprofits indicate efficiency and quality benefits from competition between units or
firms for limited resources controlled by scrutinizing decision-makers (Barman, 2002;
Hill, Hitt & Hoskisson, 1992; Schlesinger, 1998; Thorpe & Brecher, 1988; Weisbrod,
1998). However, empirical studies have not tested nonprofit competition’s effect on
foundation decisions.
Due to incomplete information about program outcomes (Center for Effective
Philanthropy, 2002), foundations will emphasize financial efficiency measures in their
grant searches. Greater numbers of grant applications in more competitive markets will
lead to greater information asymmetries and greater information costs. Even though
foundations will require more information on grant applications, they will tend to become
more selective along objective measures as grant applications increase (Gronbjerg et al,
2000). Competition will therefore have a moderating impact on the importance that
foundations place on program efficiency when deciding between competing grantees, as
tested with interactions between market competition and organizational variables. More
specifically, as competition increases, the relative importance of program efficiency in
grant decisions will increase.
H4b, c, d: Greater competition will increase the impact of program efficiency on
the likelihood of receiving foundation grants.
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Competition
+
+
Program Efficiency
Grants (b) Likelihood, (c) Number, and (d) Amount
Alternatively, from the grantee perspective, the impact of increased marketing and
fundraising expenditures to attract foundation grantmakers’ attention and approval on
grant receipt will be also be moderated by inter-organization competition. Feigenbaum
(1987) argues that when faced with competition, fundraising is an effective tool to
differentiate a nonprofit from its peers. Since the quality and quantity of charitable
outputs of donation-reliant organizations are difficult and costly for donors to assess,
nonprofits rely on marketing expenditures to gain donors’ trust and contributions
(Bielefeld, 1992; Chektovich and Frumkin, 2003; Steinberg, 1997). In competitive
markets, fundraising both lowers donors’ costs to donating to charities and gives some
nonprofits comparative advantages, signaling their own quality to potential donors
(Feigenbaum, 1987). Because these signaling effects will hold greater importance in
more crowded grants markets, fundraising expenditures will have a greater positive
impact on receiving foundation grants in more competitive environments.
H4e, f, g: Greater competition will increase the impact of fundraising
expenditures on the likelihood of receiving foundation grants.
Competition
+
+
Grants (e) Likelihood, (f) Number, and (g) Amount
Fundraising Expenses
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CHAPTER 4
DATA AND METHODOLOGY

This research uses unique data on 74 foundations in Georgia that were responsible
for 58% of all foundation giving in the state in 2005. All 1,264 grantmaking foundations
that filed an IRS Form 990 in 2005 composed the population list. The top ten foundations
in the state were purposively included to capture a greater proportion of overall grants in
the state. The remaining foundations were sampled from independent, family, and
corporate foundation groups from different regions in Georgia. A sample was stratified
by regions of the state and by foundation type. Foundations were then randomly selected
within those strata to represent both the geographic distribution pattern and each
foundation type from the population of 990 filing foundations in the state. I exclude
community and operating foundations from my sample because community foundations
include large proportions of donor advised funds directed by individuals other than
foundation boards and operating foundations typically support only one organization. The
final foundation sample is representative of foundations of those types across Georgia
and includes 68 foundations across ten regions of the state. Six are corporate foundations,
39 independent foundations, and the remaining 23 are family foundations, having greater
than 65% of the board in the same family. The sample foundations had a median total
giving of $856,000 and distributed over $200 million in grants to over 900 nonprofits in
Georgia in 2005.
I combined the sample foundations’ IRS 990-PF data with Form 990 data (NCCS,
2007) on all 932 nonprofit organizations in Georgia that received grants from them in
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2005, and 4,843 comparative nonprofits in Georgia that did not receive grants. In all, the
grantees received 1,740 grants with a median grant amount of $10,000. While some
received funding from as many as 16 foundations in the sample, the average grantee
received awards from 2 foundations, with a median total funding of $20,000. The
comparative nonprofits include all organizations in the state that filed Form 990s in 2005
and that were coded by the National Center for Charitable Statistics as being in the same
(three-digit) NTEE-CC specific subsectors as the grantee organizations in the dataset. By
selecting these organizations, I limit the analysis to organizations within specific
nonprofit industries that seek foundation grants on the local and state level.
Preliminary analyses find foundation giving to be highly localized: foundations
awarded two-thirds of all grants to nonprofits in the same or a neighboring county
(Ashley et al, 2007). I therefore define the local grants market regionally based on
clusters of counties within the state, following the boundaries of Georgia’s 12 regions set
by the state (Georgia.gov). Under this operationalization, grant-seeking nonprofits
compete against other organizations in their same region for grants from foundations that
are active within their region. Since foundations in the sample fund across subsector areas
but determine individual grants based on specific program areas and because, just as in
for-profit markets, the presence of substitute organizations is a driver of nonprofit
competitive pressures (Tuckman, 1998), I further operationalize competition as being
between nonprofits in the same specific (3-digit) National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities
Core Codes (NTEE-CC) subsector industry category. Therefore, I define competitive
markets as existing when organizations in the same region are in the same specific
industry subsector. For instance, under this market definition, performing arts theaters
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compete against other theaters in the same county cluster for grants since they are near
substitutes, but they do not directly compete with museums or other nonprofit arts
organizations, or with theaters in other regions of the state.
Because of a concern about a modifiable areal unit problem resulting from
aggregating data based on abstract geographic boundaries (Fotheringham and Wong,
1991; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modifiable_areal_unit_problem), I perform a
sensitivity analysis using other market geographic boundaries at the county and state
levels. Also due to a concern that competition for grants may be broader than between
nonprofits of the same specific subsector industries, I perform additional sensitivity
analysis using other market definitions measuring competition between organizations in
the same NTEE subsector (27 alphabetical codes, including separate industries for
hospitals and higher education) and major industry (12 major subsector groups).
Following Thornton (2006), I measure competition by both the number of
organizations and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in each market. The HHI is
constructed using total private and public contributions (including general donations and
foundation and government grants) and represents the sum of the square of all
organizations’ share of total contributions in the market. The HHI is a standard market
index showing the relative concentration of resources within specific organizations. The
index ranges from 0 to 10,000 with 0 being fully competitive and 10,000 meaning all
market resources are concentrated in one organization (i.e., a monopoly situation).
Foundation activity in each market is measured by the number of foundations that gave
grants to each subsector-region group, representing how much influence they have on
organizations in the market.
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Following Tinkelman and Mankaney (2007), I restrict the sample to organizations
that report both fundraising and administrative expenses, combined fundraising and
administrative expenses greater than $1000, and contributions revenue. Because many
organizations report zero fundraising expenses, this reduces the sample but limits the
analysis to organizations with more reliable data (Krishnan, Yetman, and Yetman, 2006;
Tinkelman and Mankaney, 2007).4 To make sure a few influential observations with
outlier data will not bias estimates, I exclude an additional 11 observations reporting
fundraising cost ratios (i.e., fundraising expenses to private contributions earned) over 4.5
Competition variables are generated before the sample restrictions to preserve market
density and other characteristics dependent on the full sample of nonprofits that file the
IRS form 990.
While 84 percent of organizations report administrative expenses, close to 70% of
organizations report zero fundraising. Non-grantees have higher zero reporting (76% vs.
37% of grantees). The restrictions stated above reduce the sample to 1,364 organizations,
with 567, or 42%, receiving grants from the foundations in the sample in 2005. 6 Even
though this reduces the sample considerably, the proportions of organizations in the
major 12 subsectors align very closely with the distribution of organizations in the

4

Although this reduces the sample to organizations with more reliable data, fundraising and administrative
expenses are still expected to be underreported across organizations, leading to a consistent bias. As
Thornton (2006, 214-215) explains, while this may “cause bias in the intercepts, slope coefficients will
remain unbiased.” See Thornton (2006) for more detailed discussion.
5
This follows Ashley and Faulk (2010). The excluded observations were over the 99th percentile (2.3) for
the fundraising cost ratio.
6
This is a higher proportion of grantees than the full, unrestricted data where 16% are grantees. However,
reducing the data makes our results more generalizable to grant-seeking nonprofits by excluding
organizations that do not seek contributions or grants (see Tinkelman & Mankaney, 2007 for more
discussion).
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population of 501(c)(3) charitable organizations that file an IRS Form 990 in the Georgia.
As shown in table 1, higher education, health, and human service organizations are
slightly over-represented, and hospitals, education, public benefit, and religious
organizations are slightly under-represented.
Table 1: Summary of Sample Industry Subsector Statistics
Major Subsector
Arts
Higher Education
Education
Hospitals
Environment
Health
Human Services
International
Public Benefit
Religious
Total

Sample
Freq. Percent
130
9.53
26
1.91
232
17.01
6
0.44
55
4.03
172
12.61
450
32.99
24
1.76
151
11.07
118
8.65
1,364
100

Population
Freq. Percent
668
9.22
42
0.58
1,355
18.71
127
1.75
286
3.95
762
10.52
2,223
30.69
122
1.68
872
12.04
760
10.49
7,217
100

Based on the market definition of specific NTEE-CC subsectors grouped by 12
regions in the state, shown in figure 1, the restricted data include 668 grant markets. As
shown in table 2 below, the Atlanta metro area (region 3) holds one-third of the markets,
which is consistent with the overall distribution of nonprofits in the state (Ashley et al,
2007). Summary statistics on these variables for the entire data and for individual major
industry subsectors is provided in tables 3 and 4 below.

46

Figure 1: 12 Georgia Regions
Source: http://www.georgia.gov/00/channel_title/0,2094,4802_4977,00.html
Table 2: 12 Georgia Regions
GA 12
Region
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Total

Freq.
50
51
221
27
55
39
46
45
12
29
31
62
668

Percent
7.49
7.63
33.08
4.04
8.23
5.84
6.89
6.74
1.8
4.34
4.64
9.28
100
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Table 3: Inter-Organization Competition and Foundation Activity
Variable
HHI
N Organizations
N Foundations

Obs
668
668
668

Mean
6740
6
2

Std.
Dev.
2924
13
3

Min
532
1
0

Max
10000
240
24

Table 4: Inter-Organization Competition and Foundation Activity by Subsector

Major Subsector
Arts
Higher Education
Education
Hospitals
Environment
Health
Human Services
International
Public Benefit
Religious

Mean
HHI
6932
7946
5150
7580
7057
7397
6715
7519
7224
4912

Mean N
Organizations
4.6
2.5
12.1
5.8
4.5
4.3
5.0
6.5
5.2
22.2

Mean N
Foundations
1.9
6.3
3.5
0.6
2.2
1.7
1.4
1.5
1.9
1.1

The density graphs below in Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate the variation in the
amount of local competition across markets. As portrayed in the descriptive statistics
above and the graphs below, the average market is concentrated, or non-competitive,
based on the common HHI threshold of 2000 for competitive markets. However,
competition varies by subsector and region. Within the metro Atlanta region, as shown in
table 5, education, hospital, and religious subsectors appear the most competitive, based
on HHI.
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Table 5: HHI by Subsector within the Metro Atlanta Region
Major Subsector
Arts
Higher Education
Education
Hospitals
Environment
Health
Human Services
International
Public Benefit
Religious

Mean
HHI
5114
6644
2627
2463
7442
6203
5356
6098
6058
2968

Mean N
Organizations
9
6
32
18
6
7
10
12
10
73

0

.00005

Density
.0001

.00015

.0002

Kernel density estimate

0

2000

4000

6000
HHI

kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 716.3919

Figure 2: Inter-Organization Competition (HHI)
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0
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Figure 3: Inter-Organization Competition (N)
Given the nested structure of these data, with nonprofit organizations nested
within subsectors and regions, I use hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to estimate the
models. This method is designed for grouped observations that are not fully independent
and allows for more reliable parameter estimates than using non-hierarchical models,
such as OLS, with this type of data since using identical values of local market-level
variables for multiple organization-level observations violates the independence of
observations assumption (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). In this analysis, organization
variables from a digitized 2005 NCCS 990 data file on organizations in each local
nonprofit market are included on level-one, and market variables for competition between
organizations are included on the second level of the data.7

7

I also estimate the models using alternative techniques, including OLS, panel analysis, and generalized
linear models (GLM). The parameter estimates across estimation techniques are consistent, though the
statistical significance of the coefficients is often stronger under the alternative estimations.
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I operationalize program efficiency as the log of program expenses as a
proportion of total expenses, which is conceptually the same as other studies’ price
variables that combine fundraising and administrative costs into one variable (Tinkelman
& Mankaney, 2007).8 I use the log of the administrative and fundraising expenses
reported in organizations’ Form 990. For the purposes of this analysis, I assume that
increased administrative expenses contribute to professionalizing the work force and that
additional fundraising expenses strengthen organizational marketing. Fundraising
efficiency is the log of the ratio of total private contributions (i.e., contributions not
including government grants) to fundraising expenses. Revenue concentration is the log
of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of Revenue Concentration, calculated as the
sum of the squares of the shares of each revenue stream as proportions of total revenues
(including direct and indirect private contributions, government grants, program revenue,
dues, net income from special events, gross profit from sales of inventory, and other
revenue).9
Level-1 organizational controls include the logs of total assets to control for size
and age, calculated as the number of years since receiving exempt status. Because
location in Atlanta may explain some of the effects of competition, I control for location
in Fulton or DeKalb counties. I also include the log of government funding to control for
income interactions with government grants (following Tinkelman & Mankaney, 2007)
as well as the administrative costs of managing government grants independently from

8

7 observations were set to missing because they reported program efficiency greater than 1.
This definition follows Hager (2001) by setting individual revenue streams to zero if they are reported
negative. Even though market HHI is measured 0 to 10000, revenue concentration HHI is commonly
measured 0 to1.
9
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private contributions and foundation funding in all models except those estimating
revenue concentration. I control for the log of contributions reliance, measured as the
percentage of private contributions to total revenues10, in models other than the revenue
concentration and fundraising efficiency models since reliance on charitable
contributions plays a significant role in self-selection of seeking charitable funds or
applying for foundation grants (Tinkelman & Mankaney, 2007).11 I also control for
lagged contributions, measured by the log of total contributions from the previous three
years. Finally, I control for the level of foundation activity in each subsector market,
measured as the logged number of foundations that gave grants to the same NTEE-CC
subsector group and made grants in the same geographic region, to account for variable
exposure to grantmaking foundations in the sample in the grant estimation models.
I include organization level summary statistics on the raw variables in table 6
below.

Table 6: Organization Level Summary Statistics
Variable
Grantee
Total Grants
Total Amount
Program Efficiency
Fundraising Efficiency
Fundraising Expenses
Revenue Concentration

Mean
0.416
0.900
115,785
0.741
79
314,878
0.671

10

Std. Dev.
0.493
1.626
583,921
0.195
648
4,139,486
0.226

Min
0
0
0
0
0.013
9
0.193

Max
1
16
7,534,742
0.995
17689
142,000,000
1

Private contributions do not include government grants. I also subtract the total amount of grants each
organization received from foundations in the sample from private contributions.
11
I do not include contributions reliance in the fundraising efficiency models because contributions are on
the left side of the equation. I exclude contributions reliance and government grants from the revenue
concentration models for the same reason.
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Table 6 continued
Management Expenses
Age
Assets (EOY)
Fulton/DeKalb County
Lagged Contributions
Government Grants
Contributions Reliance

715,146
4,265,552
19
16
20,100,000 237,000,000
0.403
0.491
7,138,883
76,300,000
928,810
12,900,000
0.552
0.345

16
85,600,000
0
80
0 8,250,000,000
0
1
0 2,150,000,000
0
353,000,000
0
1

Note: Observations = 1364 on all variables.

Following Tinkelman and Mankaney (2007), I log all variables to reduce the
impact of skewed data, which is prevalent in 990 data.12 Using log transformations also
allows me to report the coefficients as elasticities. I also perform the analysis with
variables in their raw form to check the robustness of the estimates based on
specification.
To test the hypotheses, summarized in table 7 below, nine sets of equations are
presented.
Table 7: Study Hypotheses
Nonprofit Financial Behavior Hypotheses

H1a

Greater foundation activity in nonprofit subsector and geographic markets will
lead to greater average nonprofit fundraising expenses in those markets.
H1b Greater foundation activity in nonprofit subsector and geographic markets will
lead to greater average nonprofit administrative expenses in those markets.
H2a Greater competition between grant-seeking nonprofits will lead to greater average
fundraising expenses.
H2b Greater competition between grant-seeking nonprofits will lead to lower average
nonprofit fundraising efficiency.
H2c Greater competition between grant-seeking nonprofits will lead to higher average
reported program efficiency.

12

I added one (or one thousandth for ratios) to variables with zero values to transform them to logs.
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Table 7 continued
H2d Greater competition between grant-seeking nonprofits will lead to lower average
revenue concentration.
Foundation Grant Decision Hypotheses

H3a
H3b
H3c
H3d
H3e
H3f
H3g
H3h
H3i

Greater program efficiency will make organizations more likely to receive a
foundation grant.
Greater program efficiency will lead to greater numbers of foundation grants
received.
Greater program efficiency will lead to greater combined grant amounts from all
foundation grant sources.
Greater fundraising expenditures will make organizations more likely to receive a
foundation grant
Greater fundraising expenditures will lead to greater numbers of foundation grants
received.
Greater fundraising expenditures will lead to greater combined grant amounts from
all foundation grant sources.
Greater organizational size will make organizations more likely to receive a
foundation grant.
Greater organizational size will lead to greater numbers of foundation grants
received.
Greater organizational size will lead to greater combined grant amounts from all
foundation grant sources.

Moderating Impact of Competition on Grant Selection Hypotheses

H4a

Greater competition for foundation funding will lead to a lower likelihood for
organizations to receive a foundation grant, on average.
H4b Greater competition will increase the impact of program efficiency on the
likelihood of receiving a foundation grant.
H4c Greater competition will increase the impact of program efficiency on the number
of foundation grants received.
H4d Greater competition will increase the impact of program efficiency on the total
grant amounts from all foundation grant sources.
H4e Greater competition will increase the impact of fundraising expenditures on the
likelihood of receiving a foundation grant.
H4f Greater competition will increase the impact of fundraising expenditures on the
number of foundation grants received.
H4g Greater competition will increase the impact of fundraising expenditures on the
total grant amounts from all foundation grant sources.
Hypotheses 1a through 2d are tested with two-level random-intercept, fixed-slope
models testing the impacts of competition on levels of fundraising expenses,
administrative expenses, fundraising efficiency, program efficiency, and revenue
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concentration, controlling for organizational size, age, subsector, and the number of
foundations in the market. I show the equation set for each of these dependent variables
below:
Equation Set 1
L1:
L2:

Yf = b0 + b1X1 + b2X 2+ b3X3+ b4X4+ b5X5+ b6X6+ r
b0 = γ00 + γ01W1 + γ01W2 + γ01W3 + u0
b1 = γ10 + u1
b2 = γ20 + u2
b3 = γ30 + u3

Where:
Yf is fundraising expenses
X1 is the size of the organization (assets)
X2 is the age of the organization (age)
X3 is location in Fulton or DeKalb county
X4 is the lagged contributions (contributions from the previous 3 years)
X5 is the amount of government grants received (government grants)
X6 is the ratio of contributions reliance (private contributions / total revenue)
W1 is the competition between organizations in the same subsector market
W2 is the number of foundations active in each subsector market
W3 is the major NTEE subsector (Arts is the reference group)
r is the individual grantee level error term
u0 is the subsector-county level intercept error term
u1-3 are the subsector-county level slope error terms
Equation Set 2
L1:
L2:

Ya = b0 + b1X1 + b2X 2+ b3X3+ b4X4+ b5X5+ b6X6+ r
b0 = γ00 + γ01W1 + γ01W2 + γ01W3 + u0
b1 = γ10 + u1
b2 = γ20 + u2
b3 = γ30 + u3

Where:
Ya is administrative expenses
X1 is the size of the organization
X2 is the age of the organization
X3 is location in Fulton or DeKalb county
X4 is the lagged contributions (contributions from the previous 3 years)
X5 is the amount of government grants received (government grants)
X6 is the ratio of contributions reliance (private contributions / total revenue)
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W1 is the competition between organizations in the same subsector market
W2 is the number of foundations active in each subsector market
W3 is the major NTEE subsector (Arts is the reference group)
r is the individual grantee level error term
u0 is the subsector-county level intercept error term
u1-3 are the subsector-county level slope error terms
Equation Set 3
L1:
L2:

Yfe = b0 + b1X1 + b2X 2+ b3X3+ b4X4 + b5X5+ r
b0 = γ00 + γ01W1 + γ01W2 + γ01W3 + u0
b1 = γ10 + u1
b2 = γ20 + u2
b3 = γ30 + u3

Where:
Yfe is the fundraising efficiency ratio (private contributions / fundraising
expenses)
X1 is the size of the organization (assets)
X2 is the age of the organization (age)
X3 is location in Fulton or DeKalb county
X4 is the lagged contributions (contributions from the previous 3 years)
X5 is the amount of government grants received (government grants)
W1 is the competition between organizations in the same subsector market
W2 is the number of foundations active in each subsector market
W3 is the major NTEE subsector (Arts is the reference group)
r is the individual grantee level error term
u0 is the subsector-county level intercept error term
u1-3 are the subsector-county level slope error terms
Equation Set 4
L1:
L2:

Ype = b0 + b1X1 + b2X 2+ b3X3+ b4X4+ b5X5+ b6X6+ r
b0 = γ00 + γ01W1 + γ01W2 + γ01W3 + u0
b1 = γ10 + u1
b2 = γ20 + u2
b3 = γ30 + u3

Where:
Ype is the program efficiency ratio (program expenses / total expenses)
X1 is the size of the organization (assets)
X2 is the age of the organization (age)
X3 is location in Fulton or DeKalb county
X4 is the lagged contributions (contributions from the previous 3 years)

56

X5 is the amount of government grants received (government grants)
X6 is the ratio of contributions reliance (private contributions / total revenue)
W1 is the competition between organizations in the same subsector market
W2 is the number of foundations active in each subsector market
W3 is the major NTEE subsector (Arts is the reference group)
r is the individual grantee level error term
u0 is the subsector-county level intercept error term
u1-3 are the subsector-county level slope error terms
Equation Set 5
L1:
L2:

Yrc = b0 + b1X1 + b2X 2 + b3X3 + r
b0 = γ00 + γ01W1 + γ01W2 + γ01W3 + u0
b1 = γ10 + u1
b2 = γ20 + u2
b3 = γ30 + u3

Where:
Yrc is the revenue concentration index
X1 is the size of the organization (assets)
X2 is the age of the organization (age)
X3 is location in Fulton or DeKalb county
W1 is the competition between organizations in the same subsector market
W2 is the number of foundations active in each subsector market
W3 is the major NTEE subsector (Arts is the reference group)
r is the individual grantee level error term
u0 is the subsector-county level intercept error term
u1-3 are the subsector-county level slope error terms
To test hypothesis 4a, I center the organizational controls on their sample means
so that the intercept represents the average organization along each of the control
variables. A Level-2 variable for competition (HHI or N) is introduced to explain
variation in the y-intercept in each model, controlling for the 5 major NTEE subsector
categories (arts, education, health, human services, and other, with arts as the reference
group). H3a expects competition to have a negative effect on the intercept in the
fundraising expense model.
The level-1 and level-2 random-intercept, fixed-slope equations to test H3a are:
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Equation Set 6
L1: ln(p/1-p) Yg = b0 + bpeXpe + bfX f + b1X1 + b2X 2+ b3X3+ b4X4+ b5X5+ b6X6 + r
L2:
b0 = γ00 + γ01W1 + γ01W2 + γ01W3 + u0
b1 = γ10 + u1
b2 = γ20 + u2
b3 = γ30 + u3
Where:
Yg is a dummy variable for receiving a grant from a foundation in the sample
Xpe is the program efficiency (program expenses / total expenses)
Xf is the fundraising expenses (fundraising expenses)
X1 is the size of the organization (assets)
X2 is the age of the organization (age)
X3 is location in Fulton or DeKalb county
X4 is the lagged contributions (contributions from the previous 3 years)
X5 is the amount of government grants received (government grants)
X6 is the ratio of contributions reliance (private contributions / total revenue)
W1 is the competition between organizations in the same subsector market
W2 is the number of foundations active in each subsector market
W3 is the major NTEE subsector (Arts is the reference group)
r is the individual grantee level error term
u0 is the subsector-county level intercept error term
u1-3 are the subsector-county level slope error terms

Because descriptive statistics show that a disproportionate number of the observations did
not receive grants in 2005 with variances greater than the means (i.e., overdispersion of
the dependent variable), I estimate the model using an overdispersed multilevel logit
analysis to predict receiving a foundation grant.
To test the foundation grant distribution hypotheses 3a, 3d, and 3g testing the
impacts of program efficiency, fundraising expenses, and size on the likelihood of getting
a foundation grant, and to test hypotheses 4b and 4e on the moderating effects of
competition on the likelihood of receiving a grant, I use the following two-level
overdispersed logit random-intercept, random-slope model:
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Equation Set 7
L1: ln(p/1-p) Yg = b0 + bpeXpe + bfX f + b1X1 + b2X 2+ b3X3+ b4X4+ b5X5+ b6X6 + r
L2:
b0 = γ00 + γ01W1 + γ01W2 + γ01W3 + u0
b1 = γ10 + γ11W1 + γ11W2 + γ11W3 + u1
b2 = γ20 + γ21W1 + γ21W2 + γ21W3 + u2
b3 = γ30 + u3
b4 = γ40 + u4
b5 = γ50 + u5
b6 = γ60 + u6
b7 = γ70 + u7
b8 = γ80 + u8
Where:
Yg is the a dummy variable for receiving a grant from a foundation in the
sample
Xpe is the program efficiency (program expenses / total expenses)
Xf is the fundraising expenses (fundraising expenses)
X1 is the size of the organization (assets)
X2 is the age of the organization (age)
X3 is location in Fulton or DeKalb county
X4 is the lagged contributions (contributions from the previous 3 years)
X5 is the amount of government grants received (government grants)
X6 is the ratio of contributions reliance (private contributions / total revenue)
W1 is the competition between organizations in the same subsector market
W2 is the number of foundations active in each subsector market
W3 is the major NTEE subsector (Arts is the reference group)
r is the individual grantee level error term
u0 is the subsector-county level intercept error term
u1-8 are the subsector-county level slope error terms
Because descriptive statistics also indicate that many organizations receive more
than one grant from multiple foundations, I test hypotheses 3b, 3e, 3h, 4c, and 4f using
multilevel Poisson models to test the impacts of key variables on the number of
foundation grants received. Finally, I test hypotheses 3c, 3f, 3i, 4d, and 4g using nested
tobit models to test the impact of key variables on the total amount of all grant awards
received. To account for the overdispersion of zero values on the dependent variables in
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these models, the Poisson models are specified as overdispersed and the tobit model
accounts for left-censoring at 0. H3b through H3i expect program efficiency, fundraising
expenses, and size to have positive effects on receiving grants (both in terms of the
number of grants received and total grant amounts). Following this, the same Level-2
variables as in the first model set (competition and subsector market controls) are
introduced in cross-level interactions (i.e., interaction terms) with program efficiency and
fundraising expenses to test H4c through H4g, which expect competition to have positive
moderating effects on program efficiency, fundraising expense, and size impacts on
predicted grant success.
For all models, I center all variables other than dummy variables at the sample
means.13 Due to the centering methods described, the model intercepts may be interpreted
as arts organizations outside of Fulton and DeKalb counties with the average program
efficiency, fundraising expenses, assets, lagged contributions, government funding,
private contributions reliance, competition and foundation activity compared to all
organizations across sample. I also estimate the models using full maximum likelihood in
order to compare models with likelihood ratio tests (Crawley, 2007; Raudenbush and
Bryk, 2002).
In models 8 and 9 the number and amounts of foundation grants is estimated with
level 1 and level 2 equations as:

13

Enders and Tofighi (2007), Hofmann and Gavin (1998), and Kreft, de Leeuw and Aiken (1995) argue
that grand mean centering yields more reliable estimates than uncentered variables. While they find groupmean centering tends to produce more consistent and reliable estimates in multilevel models with crosslevel interactions as is done in this section of the analysis, my data have many level 2 groups with only one
observation, limiting the use of group-mean centering.
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Equation Set 8
L1:Total Grants = b0 + bpeXpe + bfX f + b1X1 + b2X 2+ b3X3+ b4X4+ b5X5+ b6X6 + r
L2:
b0 = γ00 + γ01W1 + γ01W2 + γ01W3 + u0
b1 = γ10 + γ11W1 + γ11W2 + γ11W3 + u1
b2 = γ20 + γ21W1 + γ21W2 + γ21W3 + u2
b3 = γ30 + u3
b4 = γ40 + u4
b5 = γ50 + u5
b6 = γ60 + u6
b7 = γ70 + u7
b8 = γ80 + u8
Where:
Total Grants is the number of grants received
Xpe is the program efficiency (program expenses / total expenses)
Xf is the fundraising expenses (fundraising expenses)
X1 is the size of the organization (assets)
X2 is the age of the organization (age)
X3 is location in Fulton or DeKalb county
X4 is the lagged contributions (contributions from the previous 3 years)
X5 is the amount of government grants received (government grants)
X6 is the ratio of contributions reliance (private contributions / total revenue)
W1 is the competition between organizations in the same subsector market
W2 is the number of foundations active in each subsector market
W3 is the major NTEE subsector (Arts is the reference group)
r is the individual grantee level error term
u0 is the subsector-county level intercept error term
u1-8 are the subsector-county level slope error terms
and
Equation Set 9
L1:
L2:

Ytga = b0 + bpeXpe + bfX f + b1X1 + b2X 2+ b3X3+ b4X4+ b5X5+ b6X6 + r
b0 = γ00 + γ01W1 + γ01W2 + γ01W3 + u0
b1 = γ10 + γ11W1 + γ11W2 + γ11W3 + u1
b2 = γ20 + γ21W1 + γ21W2 + γ21W3 + u2
b3 = γ30 + u3
b4 = γ40 + u4
b5 = γ50 + u5
b6 = γ60 + u6
b7 = γ70 + u7
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b8 = γ80 + u8
Where:
Ytga is total grant amounts
Xpe is the program efficiency (program expenses / total expenses)
Xf is the fundraising expenses (fundraising expenses)
X1 is the size of the organization (assets)
X2 is the age of the organization (age)
X3 is location in Fulton or DeKalb county
X4 is the lagged contributions (contributions from the previous 3 years)
X5 is the amount of government grants received (government grants)
X6 is the ratio of contributions reliance (private contributions / total revenue)
W1 is the competition between organizations in the same subsector market
W2 is the number of foundations active in each subsector market
W3 is the major NTEE subsector (Arts is the reference group)
r is the individual grantee level error term
u0 is the subsector-county level intercept error term
u1-8 are the subsector-county level slope error terms
In summary, this analysis tests the impacts of foundation activity and competition
in local grants markets on organization behavior and receiving philanthropic grants. In
the following chapters, I present my findings and discuss the implications for policy and
practice.

62

CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS

In this chapter, I test my hypotheses with the data and methods described in the
previous chapter. I begin with a comparison of summary statistics for grantees and nongrantees (Table 8). Next, I analyze the financial behavior models (models 1-5, Table 9)
testing hypotheses H1a-H2d. I then test the grant distribution hypothesis (H4a) and grant
decision hypotheses (H3a-i) in models 6-8 (Table 10). Finally, I test the moderating
effects of competition on the importance of program efficiency and fundraising expenses
on grant success (H4b-g) in models 9-11 in Table 11. Competition measured by both the
number of near substitute organizations and HHI have consistent effects across the
models shown. To facilitate the interpretation of the analysis and because the number of
competitor organizations holds more intuitive sense, I focus the analysis below on models
operationalizing competition as the number of organizations in the same specific industry
and same geographic region in the state.
The market definition I use includes over 200 specific nonprofit industries based
on the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities Core Codes (NTEE-CC). Throughout, I
discuss the robustness of the findings across different market definitions and model
specifications. To check the sensitivity of the findings to market definition, I test other
industry groupings along the major 12 and major 27 industry classifications, as explained
in chapter 4. I also test the robustness of the models based on geographic market,
including separate market definitions at the county and state levels. Finally, I test models
with variables in their raw instead of logged form. In general, the findings from the
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sensitivity analysis exhibit the same significance and signs as those reported in the tables
below, supporting the robustness of these findings.
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics of grantees and non-grantees (Table 8) show that grantees are
larger and older than non-grantees. The table includes the differences between grantees
and non-grantees and the significance of those differences for each variable.14 While
fundraising expenses and efficiency are not significantly different, grantees spend
significantly more on management while having significantly greater program efficiency.
Grantees also have significantly more diversified revenue portfolios and earn greater
amounts of government grants. Greater proportions of grantees are located in Fulton or
DeKalb counties and are in markets with significantly greater foundation activity.
Meanwhile, grantees’ markets are significantly more concentrated in terms of the number
of substitute organizations and HHI. Consistent with my expectations, these summary
statistics show that more established organizations with access to foundations and with
relatively low competition tend to have greater success in the grants marketplace. The
following multivariate models test my specific hypotheses controlling for potential
confounding factors.

14

I test the significance of the differences between grantees and non-grantees with t tests and Wilcoxon
tests for the group of subsector dummies.
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Table 8: Grantee vs. Non-Grantee Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLES
Program Efficiency

Grantees
0.767
(0.145)

Non-Grantees
0.723
(0.221)

Difference
0.044***

Fundraising Expenses†

0.382
(1.903)

0.267
(5.173)

0.114

Management Expenses†

1.235
(5.630)

0.346
(2.879)

0.890***

Fundraising Efficiency
Revenue Concentration
Assets (EOY)†
Age
Fulton / DeKalb County

90.01
(910.00)

71.38
(360.40)

18.63

0.633
(0.217)

0.699
(0.227)

-0.066***

41.420
(362.000)

4.896
(46.770)

36.524**

25.36
(17.70)

15.33
(13.12)

10.03***

0.515
(0.500)

0.324
(0.468)

Contributions (previous 3 years) †

10.520
(73.400)

4.732
(78.300)

5.788

Government Grants†

1.953
(19.920)

199.913
(1.497)

1.753**

Contributions Reliance

0.677
(0.766)

0.845
(1.349)

-0.168**

Market HHI

5,506
(3,088)

N Market Organizations

15.60
(32.28)

4,733
(3,093)
28.44
(54.67)

0.191***

773***
-12.84***

N Market Foundations

4.901
(4.729)

3.365
(4.832)

1.536***

Arts

0.104
(0.306)

0.0891
(0.285)

0.0149

Higher Education

0.0353
(0.185)

0.008
(0.087)

0.028***

Education

0.175
(0.380)

0.167
(0.373)

0.008

Hospitals

0.002

0.006

-0.005
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Table 8 continued
(0.042)

(0.079)

Environment

0.048
(0.213)

0.035
(0.184)

0.013

Health

0.141
(0.348)

0.115
(0.320)

0.026

Human Services

0.319
(0.467)

0.338
(0.473)

-0.019

International

0.014
(0.118)

0.020
(0.140)

-0.006

Public Benefit

0.125
(0.331)

0.100
(0.301)

0.025

Religious

0.037
(0.189)

0.122
(0.327)

567

797

Observations

-0.085***

Significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, Standard Errors in parentheses
†
In millions.

5.2 The Impact of Foundations on Nonprofit Fundraising and Overhead
My first two hypotheses, H1a and H1b, are that greater foundation activity in a
nonprofit market increases nonprofits’ fundraising and administrative expenses as
organizations compete for and manage grants. Because foundations play a large role in
the institutional environment for grant-seeking organizations, the number of foundations
making grants to organizations in any given market influences organizational behavior.
Since foundations demand quality and accountability from their grantees, foundation
activity influences organizations to professionalize their management. Because
organizations with more professionalized fundraising practices will earn greater grants,
foundation activity also promotes greater fundraising expenses as organizations vie for
those funds and mimic successful organizations in the market.
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These expectations are supported by positive and significant coefficients on the
foundation activity variable on fundraising and administrative expenses in models 1 and
2. As the number of foundations in a market doubles, nonprofit fundraising expenses are
expected to increase by 7 percent and administrative expenses are expected to rise by 4
percent holding the other variables constant. These findings indicate that foundations
create pressures on organizations to professionalize their operations and spend more on
administrative and fundraising functions.
These findings are economically significant for nonprofit managers. Increasing
the number of foundations from the mean of 2 to 10 increases an organization’s expected
administrative expenses by around 22 percent and fundraising expenses by 36 percent.
For the average arts organization outside of Fulton and DeKalb counties with the average
size, age, lagged contributions, government grants, and contributions reliance
(represented by the model intercept), and controlling for the level of competition, such an
increase in the number of foundations increases the estimated annual administrative
expenses from $52,000 to $65,000 and estimated fundraising expenses from $15,000 to
over $21,000. Having greater numbers of foundations to apply to and compete for
increases the managerial complexity organizations face, increasing their administrative
burden.
These effects are robust to geographic and subsector specification in terms of sign
and significance. Significance falls only under the region-major 12 subsector market
definition for model 1 and remains consistent across market definitions for model 2.
Across market definitions, significant effects (p<0.1) average 0.25 and 0.12 for models 1
and 2, respectively, which are greater effects than those reported here. Foundation
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activity’s impact is as great as 0.412 for model 1 and 0.237 for model 2, indicating that a
doubling of foundation activity increases fundraising expenses by 41 percent and
administrative expenses by 24 percent under those market definitions.
Table 9: Organization Financial Behavior Models
L1 Organization Variables
L2 Market Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Fundraising
Expenses

Administrative
Expenses

Fundraising
Efficiency

Program
Efficiency

Revenue
Concentration

Intercept

9.602***
(0.155)

10.862***
(0.140)

2.190***
(0.129)

-0.699***
(0.104)

-0.731***
(0.034)

Competition

-0.179***
(0.049)

-0.079⁺
(0.043)

0.064
(0.044)

-0.026
(0.023)

0.015
(0.011)

Foundation Activity

0.071***
(0.017)

0.043**
(0.015)

-0.010
(0.016)

0.009
(0.011)

0.003
(0.003)

Assets

0.439***
(0.031)

0.456***
(0.029)

0.024
(0.020)

0.013
(0.011)

-0.017***
(0.004)

Age

0.217***
(0.061)

0.168**
(0.054)

-0.150*
(0.061)

0.061*
(0.029)

-0.082***
(0.013)

Fulton/DeKalb County

0.706***
(0.105)

0.389***
(0.088)

-0.285**
(0.097)

0.022
(0.047)

0.030
(0.022)

years)

-0.001
(0.009)

-0.001
(0.008)

0.016⁺
(0.008)

0.016**
(0.005)

Government Grants

0.013
(0.009)

0.036***
(0.006)

-0.023**
(0.008)

-0.002
(0.003)

Contributions Reliance

0.110*
(0.042)

-0.275***
(0.033)

Contributions (previous 3

N Organizations
N Markets

1,364
668

1,364
668

Significance: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, Standard Errors in parentheses
All variables other than dummies are in log form.
All models control for major 12 subsector. For full tables, please see Appendix A.
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-0.145***
(0.025)
1,364
668

1,364
668

1,364
668

From a policymaker and foundation perspective, foundations appear to hold
significant influence over the professionalization of organizations. While there do not
appear to be financial efficiency gains from these pressures, there could be other
consequences related to the quality of services produced. Foundations may pressure
organizations to professionalize their operations and increase their mission impact
through more quality programming, strategic management, and program evaluation
(Bielefeld, 1992; Dolnicar et al, 2008; Froelich, 1999). However, as Dolnicar et al (2008)
argue, this professionalization could come at the cost of losing voluntary input into
nonprofit administration, which may lessen the representation of community
perspectives. As Bolduc et al (2004) show, the professionalization of fundraising could
also come at the cost of spending large amounts of administrative time on foundation
grant management, which may not be accurately reported as financial expenses on the
990 information return.
5.3 The Effect of Competition on Organization Behavior
Model 1 tests H2a, which expects competition between near substitute
organizations to lead to greater nonprofit fundraising expenses. A significant, negative
coefficient on competition indicates the opposite effect than hypothesized, that
competition leads organizations to reduce their fundraising outlays. This finding is
consistent in sign, significance and magnitude across market definitions with an average
effect of -0.22. Although this negative effect is different than most of the literature
expects, Thornton (2006) finds a similar effect and argues that as in for-profit marketing,
nonprofits receive less benefits from fundraising in more crowded markets, so they opt to
reduce their fundraising expenses.
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However, I do not find that competition leads to less fundraising efficiency in
model 3 as expected in H2b.15 Combined with a negative impact of competition on
administrative expenses16 in model 2, competition between near substitute organizations
appears to lead to more efficient organizations. However, the effects of competition on
fundraising efficiency and program efficiency in models 3 and 4 are insignificant with
some significant effects from the sensitivity analysis suggesting that competition leads to
lower fundraising and program expense efficiency overall, opposite from what
hypotheses H2b and H2c expect.
Hypothesis H2d expects competition to lead to lower average revenue
concentration. Such a finding would indicate that competition leads to organizational
stability as organizations diversify their income portfolios. However, with an
insignificant effect across model specifications and market definitions in model 5, I fail to
reject a null relationship that competition and revenue diversification are unrelated.
Instead, it appears that other factors are more important for revenue portfolios,
particularly nonprofit subsector, the effects of which I show in the full table in Appendix
A. Controlling for the other variables, all subsectors other than environment have
significantly different revenue portfolios than arts organizations. This finding supports
Young (2007) and Wilsker and Young’s (2010) “nonprofit benefits theory,” which
expects program mission (here indicated by subsector) to be the main factor in an
organization’s financial resources. Since different organizations’ programs yield different

15

I cannot confidently reject a null relationship. The effect is very sensitive to market definition but is fairly
consistently insignificant, with mixed signs for the few significant effects across market definitions.
16
This finding is fairly robust based on a sensitivity analysis with an average effect of -0.13.

70

benefits to different clients (e.g., public versus private or group benefits), nonprofits have
varying access to different sources of revenues. For instance, an organization with mostly
private benefits, such as an improvisation comedy theater, would generate fees for service
but would have a harder time appealing to government or foundations for grants.
Meanwhile, an organization that mainly produces public benefits, such as a research
institute, would have difficulty surviving on private fees but would be more appealing for
public and private grants.
Overall, competition affects organizations’ fundraising and administrative
expenses more than it influences efficiency or financial revenue diversification. Size and
age appear to matter much more than competition, with older and larger organizations
spending more on fundraising and administrative expenses. Controlling for size, age and
the other factors in the model, greater numbers of near substitute organizations competing
in the same grants market causes organizations to trim their administrative and
fundraising overhead and maintain consistent program efficiency. Supporting
Feigenbaum’s (1987) argument, competition for funds appears to drive organizations to
at least sustain levels of program efficiency and remain competitive for grants, in part by
reducing their overhead expenses.
From a policy and foundation perspective, these findings do not provide robust
support for competition leading to less efficient organizations. While it does not lead to
greater reported program efficiency, it may very well cause greater efficiencies as
organizations spend less to manage and promote their organizations. Importantly, instead
of leading to excessive fundraising as some argue, competition causes organizations to
significantly reduce their fundraising expenses. In aggregate, organizations’ fundraising
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may still be inefficient under varying levels of competition, as Thornton (2006) argues,
but they are no less efficient under greater competition. We cannot discern management
practices from these data to know how competition affects managerial efficiency
concerning program outcomes. However, from the financial data it appears that under
greater competition, nonprofits do more or the same amount with less overhead.
5.4 Organizational Determinants of Foundation Grants
Model 6 in table 10 demonstrates support for hypotheses 3a and 3d. H3a predicts
that program efficiency will positively impact the likelihood of grant success controlling
for other factors in the model. A significant (p<0.05) positive coefficient on program
efficiency indicates that grantmaking foundations make grants to more efficient
nonprofits on average. Increasing program efficiency by around 10 percent (e.g., from
spending 77 percent of overall expenses on programs to spending 85 percent) increases
an organization’s odds of receiving a foundation grant by around 6.5 percent. At the
sample averages for the other variables, increasing program efficiency by 10 percent
increases the probability of getting a grant by around 6 percentage points. Meanwhile,
organizations with higher fundraising expenses are also more successful, controlling for
the other factors in the model. With a significant coefficient of 0.196 (p<0.01) on
fundraising expenses, doubling an organization’s fundraising expenses in is expected to
yield around a 3 percentage point increase in an organization’s probability of getting a
grant, holding the other variables at their means. As expected by H3g, holding the other
variables constant, larger organizations are also expected to be more likely to receive
grants. All else equal, an organization that is double the size is expected to have 27
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percent higher odds, or a 4.4 percentage point increase in the probability of receiving a
grant.
Table 10: Explaining Foundation Grant Distribution
Model 6
Grantee

Model 7
N Grants

Intercept

-1.498***
(0.293)

-2.105***
(0.139)

-803,857***
(120,897)

Competition

-1.313***
(0.086)

-0.505***
(0.037)

-267,135***
(35,195)

Foundation Activity

0.882***
(0.050)

0.673***
(0.042)

295,295***
(37,165)

Program Efficiency

0.645*
(0.254)

0.362**
(0.122)

225,327***
(72,086)

Fundraising Expenses

0.196**
(0.065)

0.077*
(0.030)

55,869***
(20,551)

Assets

0.272***
(0.054)

0.153***
(0.030)

127,718***
(18,838)

Age

0.093
(0.119)

0.084
(0.057)

-18,172
(42,602)

Fulton/DeKalb County

0.651**
(0.181)

0.318***
(0.071)

106,509
(70,203)

Contributions (previous 3 years)

0.016
(0.016)

0.008
(0.008)

5,841
(5,647)

Government Grants

0.040**
(0.015)

0.017**
(0.006)

11,916**
(5,447)

Contributions Reliance

0.215**
(0.074)

0.070*
(0.032)

62,982**
(25,601)

1,364
668

1,364
668

1,364
668

L1 Organization Variables
L2 Market Variables

N Organizations
N Markets
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Model 8
Total Grant
Amounts

Table 10 continued
Dep. Var. = Received a grant (Model 7), Total number of grants received (Model 8), Total dollar amounts of grants received (Model
9)
Significance: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, Standard Errors in parentheses
All variables other than dummies are in log form.
All models control for major 12 subsector. For full tables, please see Appendix A.

Model 7 tests hypotheses 3b, 3e, and 3h explaining the number of grants received
and model 8 tests hypotheses 3c, 3f, and 3i explaining the total grant amounts received.
Significant positive coefficients on program efficiency, fundraising expenses, and total
assets provide further support that organizations reporting greater program efficiency,
spending more on fundraising, and that are larger, have comparative advantages over
their peers and are expected to receive more grants as well as higher overall grant
amounts, holding the other variables constant.
The significance of both program efficiency and fundraising expenses creates
tension for nonprofit managers between increasing fundraising activities to earn more
grants and spending more on programs than overhead expenses. However, since program
efficiency is not as easily influenced by managers and is bounded by a limit of spending
100 percent of all expenses on programs, managers have greater control over their grant
success (and perhaps overall fundraising efficiency) by spending more on fundraising.
5.5 The Impact of Market Factors on Grant Success
The grant distribution hypothesis, H4a, is tested in model 6, a logit model
predicting foundation grant success. H4a expects greater inter-organization competition
to lead to lower likelihoods of receiving foundation grants for organizations with the
sample average program expense ratios, fundraising expenses, size, age, government
grant revenue, lagged contributions, contributions reliance, and number of active
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foundations in their market. The intercept represents an arts organization with the sample
average of all independent variables. At sample average values of all variables in the
model, organizations have about an 18 percent chance of getting a grant. As shown in
model 6 in Table 10 and as expected, competition has a significant negative effect on the
likelihood of getting a grant. As the number of organizations in the market doubles from
the average of 6, the chances of getting a grant drop from 18 percent to around 6 percent,
holding the other variables at their averages. The odds ratio (0.27, not shown) indicates
that as competition between grant-seeking nonprofits doubles, the odds that an average
organization will receive a grant will only be one-quarter as great. The effect of
competition is robust across market definitions, with an average coefficient of -1.157,
which is slightly smaller than the effect reported in model 6.
Not surprisingly, the number of foundations present in an organization’s county is
positively related with grant success. Doubling the number of foundations in a market
from the average of 2 is expected to increase organizations’ odds of grant success
increase by around 88 percent. With 4 active foundations in a market, an organization’s
chance of getting a grant almost doubles to around 35 percent, holding the other variables
at their averages. This finding is robust across market definitions, with an average
coefficient on foundation activity across specification of 1.603, which is higher than the
effect reported in model 6.
Other than higher education and religious, subsector is generally insignificant.
With full controls, higher education organizations are less likely to get a grant and
religious organizations have slightly higher probabilities, but organizations in other
subsectors have around the same likelihood of getting a grant.
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Overall, program efficiency and fundraising expenses increase an organization’s
chances of grant success, controlling for other organization variables and market
characteristics. Inter-organization competition significantly reduces grant success for the
average organization, while the number of foundations in an organization’s market
significantly improves its chances of winning grants. The organizational and market
variables included in the models reduce the between-market variation of the intercept to a
value insignificantly different from zero, implying that they fully explain the variance in
grant success. Based on likelihood ratio tests, adding competition to models with all other
controls significantly improves the model fit (χ2 = 418.8 at 1 df, p<0.001).
5.6 The Moderating Impact of Competition on Grant Success
Next, I test the moderating impact of competition on grant selection hypotheses
(H4b-H4g) with models 9, 10, and 11 in Table 11. I test hypotheses 4b and 4e with a
logistic regression model with being a grantee as the dependent variable (model 9),
hypotheses 4c and 4f with a Poisson model estimating the number of grants received
(model 10) and hypotheses 4d and 4g with a tobit model estimating the total grant
amounts (model 11). These hypotheses expect that competition between nonprofits in the
same local grants market will act as a moderating variable, increasing the positive effects
of program efficiency and fundraising expenditures on grant success and on the total
number and amounts of grants expected.
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Table 11: Competition and the Importance of Program Efficiency and Fundraising
Model 9
Grantee

Model 10
N Grants

Model 11
Total Grant
Amounts

Intercept

-1.557***
(0.287)

-2.129***
(0.147)

-889,355***
(118,634)

Competition

-1.393***
(0.116)

-0.668***
(0.040)

-319,425***
(33,774)

Foundation Activity

0.882***
(0.056)

0.697***
(0.042)

326,770***
(36,645)

Program Efficiency

2.801**
(0.963)

0.637⁺
(0.353)

398,801⁺
(224,465)

*Competition

1.094**
(0.334)

0.292*
(0.122)

170,613⁺
(87,247)

*Foundation Activity

-0.126
(0.129)

0.040
(0.062)

-59,834
(88,102)

0.208
(0.210)

0.021
(0.071)

14,742
(48,621)

*Competition

0.047
(0.051)

0.079***
(0.013)

26,666*
(12,139)

*Foundation Activity

-0.007
(0.022)

-0.002
(0.016)

34,073**
(11,911)

Assets

0.261***
(0.055)

0.123***
(0.024)

Age

0.110
(0.129)

0.067
(0.054)

-19,312
(41,777)

Fulton/DeKalb County

0.697**
(0.209)

0.311***
(0.076)

92,542
(68,709)

Contributions (previous 3 years)

0.030
(0.019)

0.016*
(0.007)

8,872
(5,441)

Government Grants

0.042*
(0.017)

0.016**
(0.005)

9,829⁺
(5,215)

L1 Organization Variables
L2 Market Variables

Fundraising Expenses
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105,068***
(18,399)

Table 11 continued
Contributions Reliance
N Organizations
N Markets

0.367***
(0.083)
1,364
668

0.114**
(0.033)

74,465**
(24,856)

1,364
668

1,364
668

Dep. Var. = Received a grant (Model 9), Total number of grants received (Model 10), Total dollar amounts of grants received (Model
11)
All models include subsector controls as interaction terms with Program Efficiency and Fundraising Expenses, which are not shown to
simplify the table. I show the full models in Appendix A.
Significance: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, Standard Errors in parentheses

5.6.1 The Relative Importance of Program Efficiency under Varying Levels of
Competition
I find support for hypotheses H4b, H4c, and H4d expecting program efficiency to
be more important for grant success in more competitive markets. A significant and
positive coefficient on interactions of competition with program efficiency in models 9,
10, and 11 indicate that as competition increases, the impact of program efficiency
increases. At the average competition of 6 organizations and the average values of the
other variables, increasing program efficiency by 10 percent increases the probability of
getting a grant by 25 percent. At double the competition of around 12 organizations in a
market, a 10 percent increase in program efficiency increases expected probability of
getting a grant by 44 percent. At higher levels of competition, the percent change in the
probability with a 10 percent increase in program efficiency continues to increase.
However, due to the large negative coefficient on the competition variable alone, the
negative impact of competition itself on the probability of grant success outweighs the
additional benefits gained from an increased impact of program efficiency. Organizations
in more competitive markets have significantly and substantially lower odds of getting
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grants, regardless of program efficiency. While organizations receive relatively larger
gains in terms of percent change of grants expected, under greater competition program
efficiency yields less of a competitive advantage in terms of total additional grants
expected. These effects are robust across market definitions, though significance falls
under the major 12 subsector definition and when defining the geographic boundaries to
the state rather than region. Across market definitions, the average significant effect of
the competition-program efficiency interaction is 0.799 for the logit model, 0.319 for the
Poisson model, and 184,313 for the tobit model, which are around the estimates reported
in models 9, 10, and 11. Overall, market variables explain 32 percent of the slope
variance in program efficiency’s impact on grant success, with competition and
foundation activity explaining 30 percent of the variance. Based on a likelihood ratio test,
models including competition provide a significantly better fit (p<0.05) than models
without competition.
5.6.2 The Relative Importance of Fundraising Expenses under Varying Levels of
Competition
As can be seen in models 9, 10, and 11, the cross-level interactions between
competition and fundraising expenses have the expected positive coefficients and are
significant for models estimating the number of grants and total grant amounts (models
10 and 11). This indicates that competition leads to stronger positive impacts of
fundraising expenses on both the predicted number of grants and total grant amounts
awarded to nonprofits, controlling for the other variables in the models. These findings
support H3f and H3g that increases in competition between grant seeking nonprofits will
lead to more positive impacts of fundraising expenses on grant awards. That is, all else
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equal, as competition between nonprofits increases, those that market themselves more
heavily receive more, and larger, grants. However, earning additional grants comes at a
heavy cost in competitive markets. Even though the same level of fundraising increases
yield greater percent changes in grants in more competitive markets, the base
probabilities at the average fundraising levels steadily decline as competition increases.
Based on model 10, at double the average competition, an organization with the average
values of the other variables in a market with the average number of foundations can only
expect 0.06 grants (about half that expected under average competition). While doubling
fundraising expenses can increase the number of grants by 8 percent, the organization is
still not much more likely to get an additional grant. Because competition has such a
large negative expected impact on the likelihood of receiving grants, the benefits of
fundraising gained in more competitive markets is outweighed by the decreased
likelihood of getting grants for the average organization.
To interpret these effects a little more clearly, I present a more intuitive model in
Table 12 where competition, foundation activity, and fundraising expenses are centered
at zero instead of at their sample means. In this model, the intercept represents a
monopoly organization (i.e., an organization without market competitors) with zero
fundraising expenses in a market with one active foundation and the average values at the
other variables. Without competition, the organization can expect around 1 grant.
Introduce one or two additional organizations in the market, however, and the expected
number of grants drops to around 0.2. Under this level of competition, an organization
with 10 percent greater program efficiency can only expect to earn another hundredth of a
grant. By increasing fundraising expenses to $10,000, however, the organization can
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expect around half of a grant, or a 114 percent increase, showing a much larger relative
effect of fundraising than program efficiency.
Table 12: Competition and the Importance of Program Efficiency and Fundraising
Supplemental Model
L1 Organization Variables
L2 Market Variables

Model 12
N Grants

Intercept

0.324
(0.554)

Competition

-1.499***
(0.134)

Foundation Activity

0.835***
(0.189)

Program Efficiency

0.451
(0.456)

*Competition

0.423**
(0.126)

*Foundation Activity

-0.063
(0.133)
-0.031
(0.052)

Fundraising Expenses

*Competition

0.083***
(0.012)

*Foundation Activity

-0.012
(0.018)

Assets

0.121***
(0.024)

Age

0.085
(0.051)

Fulton/DeKalb County

0.315***
(0.072)
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Table 12 continued
Contributions (previous 3 years)

0.013*
(0.007)

Government Grants

0.015**
(0.005)

Contributions Reliance

0.096**
(0.033)

N Organizations
N Markets

1,364
668

Dep. Var. = Total number of grants received
The model includes subsector controls as level 2 controls and as interaction terms which are shown in the full models in Appendix A.
Significance: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, Standard Errors in parentheses

Just as in the previous models, the number of foundations in the state that give
grants to the same subsector and give grants in the same region makes a large difference.
With 10 active foundations, a monopoly organization with zero fundraising can expect
around 7 grants. Introducing one to two competitors drops the expected grants to around
1.5. By increasing fundraising to $10,000 at this level of competition, again the
organization can double its grants to 3. At greater competition, however, these effects are
greater. With 10 foundations and 10 nonprofits, without fundraising, an organization can
only expect around 0.2 grants, compared to the monopoly organization that received 7.
However, by spending $10,000 on fundraising and holding the other variables at their
averages, the organization can expect 1 grant, over a 400 percent change. Therefore,
under greater competition, organizations see greater percent changes in total grants from
the same amount of fundraising increases than organizations in less competitive markets,
but they cannot expect the same numbers of grants.
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5.7 Sensitivity Analysis
It is important to note that the market boundaries used in this analysis are only
proxies for the true competitive markets for these nonprofits, which are not known. As
discussed in chapter 4, because arbitrary boundaries specified by regional borders may
not accurately represent the nonprofits’ competitive markets, I perform a sensitivity
analysis specifying the market boundaries at the county and state levels as alternatives to
the regional market definition. I also test the models defining competition among
organizations within each of the 12 and 27 major industry classifications as an alternative
to competition within the very specific nonprofit industry NTEE-CC codes. Across
market definitions, the estimates in the models are generally consistent with those
reported above in terms of sign and significance. As a notable exception, the parameter
estimates in models 3 and 4, with fundraising efficiency and program efficiency as the
dependent variables, demonstrate considerable sensitivity to market definition in terms of
the significance and direction of effects. This finding cautions researchers and
policymakers to consider the significant bias introduced by arbitrary market boundaries
when evaluating other research relating competition in the sector to nonprofit efficiency.
Since the estimates for the efficiency models vary so widely across market definitions,
developing a more precise operationalization of nonprofit markets is essential to
establishing sound inferences and policy recommendations.
Across models shown, HHI has similar effects as competition defined as the
number of organizations in each market. Based on the sensitivity analysis, competition
measured as the number of substitute organizations is more consistently significant than
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HHI across market definitions, even though when HHI is significant it has the same sign
and similar magnitude as competition measured as the number of organizations.
Specifying competition in its raw, unlogged form also generally shows consistency with
the findings I present. However, likelihood ratio tests indicate that models with logged
variables provide a better fit. Models with the full sample, without restrictions, also
produce consistent findings to those reported here, though the significance for the cross
level interaction between competition and program efficiency falls in models 9 and 10.
Overall, interactions between competition and fundraising expenses demonstrate much
stronger consistency across models than interactions between competition and program
efficiency, lending greater support to the importance of marketing rather than efficiency
in competitive grants markets.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS

Overall, these findings demonstrate that foundation activity and inter-organization
activity significantly alter nonprofit organizations’ institutional environment. Foundation
activity in a nonprofit’s market, in particular, significantly influences the organization’s
fundraising and administrative costs. The more active foundations exist in a market, the
higher the amount the average organization spends on fundraising to attract those funds
(and presumably signal legitimacy) and the more it spends on administration. These
findings suggest that foundations in nonprofit markets exert institutional pressure on
organizations to professionalize their operations in order to both earn and manage their
grants. It is important to note that this does not necessarily imply that organizations are
less efficient in markets with greater foundation activity. Indeed, the insignificant effects
of foundation activity on fundraising and program efficiency in models 3 and 4 imply that
foundations have little influence on overall organizational financial efficiency. However,
foundations do create institutional pressures on nonprofits to be more efficient by
disproportionately selecting more efficient and established organizations for their grants.
Findings from models 6 through 8 indicate that organizations with greater program
efficiency are significantly more likely to earn more and greater amounts of grants.
Foundation activity itself also affects organizations’ probabilities of getting
grants. Organizations operating in markets without the presence of active foundations are
significantly less likely to receive foundation grants. While this finding seems rather
intuitive, it has important implications for nonprofit management, particularly in rural
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areas where foundations are not typically active. Managers of such organizations likely
better serve their organizations by focusing on other revenue sources besides foundation
grants.
Competition also plays an important role in grant selection. Organizations in
markets with greater numbers of similar organizations are significantly less likely to earn
foundation grants. With greater numbers of potential grantees, foundations in more
competitive nonprofit markets become more selective, with findings from models 9
through 11 indicating that program efficiency matters more for grant selection in more
highly competitive markets. At the same time, there is tension between the importance of
program efficiency and spending on fundraising for nonprofit managers. While program
efficiency increases an organization’s competitive edge over similar organizations vying
for foundation grants, spending on fundraising also increases an organization’s likelihood
of earning foundation grants. Like program efficiency, the impact of fundraising on grant
selection also becomes stronger as competition increases, giving organizations that spend
greater amounts on fundraising a competitive edge in those markets. Because spending
more on fundraising relative to programs decreases an organization’s program efficiency,
managers may face a dilemma of whether to increase program or fundraising
expenditures to attract greater funding. However, the findings from the sensitivity
analysis show that the effect of fundraising expenses is more robust across market
specifications than the impact program efficiency has on foundation grant success.
Managers may find fundraising expenses more easily controllable than overall program
efficiency, and while managers can only increase program efficiency to 1, there is no
upper limit to the amount they can fundraise. Additionally, as shown most clearly in the
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analysis of model 12 above, increasing fundraising expenses holds greater economic
significance in terms of the relative impact on grant success. Reasonable increases in
fundraising can have much larger impacts on grant success than reasonable increases in
program efficiency in competitive markets. Increasing fundraising from zero to $10,000
can increase grants by over four times, a much larger effect than a 10 percent increase in
program efficiency, which can only be expected to yield another hundredth of a grant.
In terms of explaining grant-making foundation behavior in competitive grantseeking markets, I find significant support that grantmakers select grant recipients along
organizational characteristics. Organizations that have greater program efficiency, are
larger, and spend more on fundraising tend to capture more grants in competitive
markets. These findings also support the expectation that nonprofit fundraising reduces
the transactions costs for grantmakers and helps overcome information asymmetries in
crowded grants markets. As competition between grant seeking nonprofits in local grants
markets increases, foundations tend to increasingly fund organizations that actively
market themselves. Greater inter-organization competition for grants also lowers the
likelihood that foundations will fund organizations with average efficiency, fundraising
expenditures, size, age, and alternative revenue streams compared to their peers. These
findings suggest that foundations do not spread their resources thinly among competing
grant seekers but instead become more selective and discerning as competition between
grant-seeking organizations increases. These findings also support previous research in
implying that spending more on fundraising is a key determinant to receiving foundation
grants.
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However, especially when faced with competition, this also implies that
foundation grants come at a significant and substantial cost to organizations. This is
particularly evidenced in the Poisson models predicting multiple grants showing that, on
average and controlling for the other variables in the models, a one hundred percent
increase in fundraising expenditures can only be expected to increase an organization’s
chances of earning an extra grant by around 8 percent. If an organization is already
spending a significant amount on fundraising, an extra grant comes at a substantial cost.
For example in model 7, with only an expected 0.077 increase in grants for every
doubling of fundraising expenditures, all else equal, an organization would need to
increase its fundraising outlays by around 1300% for each additional grant predicted
under average levels of competition (around 6 nonprofits) and average foundation
activity (around 2 foundations).
The question remains as to whether this pattern of grantmaking behavior in
competitive grants markets leads to more effective outcomes. While foundations do not
spread their resources thinly across competing organizations, greater competition leads to
higher proportions of grant-seeking nonprofits that fail to receive funding. If this leads to
a self-selection by unsuccessful nonprofits away from seeking grants and toward
alternative sources of revenues, this could imply efficient charitable outcomes from
philanthropic competition. Alternatively, this could lead to a stagnation of many
promising organizations that rely on increased foundation funding to maximize their
mission impacts. From a policy perspective, if competitive nonprofit markets arise from a
social demand for their services, foundations cannot be expected to substitute or replace
government as a universal funder of public goods. On the contrary, these results imply
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that as nonprofits proliferate, government may need to increase its funding to offset the
uncertainty of foundation grants, supporting arguments of voluntary failure and
philanthropic insufficiency (Anheier, 2005).
In terms of manager response to these findings, Chetkovich and Frumkin (2003)
argue that in order to market their organizations to funders, managers select between two
competing management strategies. The first strategy is to boost their efficiency and show
they can provide more program output for the same amount of money as their peers. The
alternative strategy is to differentiate themselves from their peers in terms of programs
and increase their fundraising to more targeted funders that share an interest in their
mission niche. Chetkovich and Frumkin find that managers prefer the second strategy to
the first and argue that this leads to increased nonprofit expertise, professionalization, and
capacity to respond to particular social needs.
My findings showing nonprofits spend more on fundraising and administration in
markets with greater foundation activity similarly support the argument that organizations
tend toward professionalization and heavier marketing rather than efficiency in markets
with greater foundation influence. Since organizations see greater economic gains from
increasing fundraising expenses than improving their program efficiency in competitive
markets, my findings suggest that managers should emphasize marketing even if it leads
to slight losses in program efficiency. However, because competition itself plays such a
large role in the likelihood of receiving grants, managers would be well advised to
undertake some form of market analysis before dedicating substantial resources or time to
foundation grant applications. Even a basic understanding of the number of similar
organizations and foundations making grants to their particular subsector in the same
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geographic area could inform managers of their realistic chances of truly entering and
competing in the market.
From a policy perspective, foundations’ apparent preference for
professionalization could lead to improved quality of nonprofit programs and missionrelated outcomes as nonprofits gain greater capacity and expertise. However, as Dolnicar
et al (2008) and Chetkovich and Frumkin (2003) discuss, such professionalization could
also lead to more corporate rather than voluntary organizational behaviors, more
emphasis on marketing rather than mission, and selection of clients based on how easy
they are to serve rather than need (i.e., “creaming”). This is a similar concern as Guo
(2007) and Smith and Lipsky (1993) raise regarding the influence of government grants
on professionalization, leading to a decline community representation among nonprofits
(also see Suarez, 2011).
Similarly, since foundations appear to become more selective as competition
increases, nonprofit competition could lead to more targeted selection by foundations and
more targeted fundraising by grantees seeking to differentiate themselves and their
particular missions from their peers. If targeted grantmaking stratifies the market due to
intense program differentiation, these segmented markets could become noncompetitive
leading to poorer quality services (Chetkovich and Frumkin, 2003). Moreover, such
targeted funding could lead to less diversity of organizations overall as only the
professionalized and established organizations grow and survive (Chetkovich and
Frumkin, 2003; Rose-Ackerman, 1982). For this reason, limiting the market through
united funding drives, such as the United Way, or creating barriers to entry in grants
markets by encouraging unsolicited grants processes could lead to market efficiencies by
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limiting the market to established organizations that can secure funding (Rose-Ackerman,
1982). However, such strategies could also lead to less diversity of organizations and
those representing minority views being further marginalized (Rose-Ackerman, 1982;
Chektovich and Frumkin, 2003).
Since foundations exert such a strong institutional pressure on nonprofits to
professionalize their operations but simultaneously create market pressures for
organizations to maintain efficiency, an alternative strategy to limiting grant market entry
could be to increase the influence foundations have across nonprofit markets by
channeling more funding through them and creating greater incentives to establish new
foundations across local regions. Public policies could include relaxing mandatory spendout policies or reducing excise taxes currently imposed on private foundations in the US,
increasing the charitable tax deduction rate to encourage more giving to foundations, or
directly funding foundations with public dollars. Since foundations are selective of
organizations based on efficiency but drive nonprofits toward professionalization of their
operations, greater numbers of diverse foundations or expanding the presence of existing
foundations more broadly across geographic markets would direct philanthropic dollars
to stable organizations, influence all organizations within nonprofit markets to
professionalize, and build overall nonprofit capacity to respond to local and regional
needs. Furthermore, by promoting ideologically diverse foundations, such a strategy
would not necessarily limit the ideological diversity organizations, leading to a stronger
sector while maintaining its diversity.
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APPENDIX A
FULL MODELS
Table 13: Organization Financial Behavior Full Models
L1 Organization Variables
L2 Market Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Fundraising
Expenses

Administrative
Expenses

Fundraising
Efficiency

Program
Efficiency

Revenue
Concentration

Intercept

9.602***
(0.155)

10.862***
(0.140)

2.190***
(0.129)

-0.699***
(0.104)

-0.731***
(0.034)

Competition

-0.179***
(0.049)

-0.079⁺
(0.043)

0.064
(0.044)

-0.026
(0.023)

0.015
(0.011)

Foundation Activity

0.071***
(0.017)

0.043**
(0.015)

-0.010
(0.016)

0.009
(0.011)

0.003
(0.003)

Higher Education

0.938***
(0.284)

1.077***
(0.242)

0.042
(0.256)

0.248⁺
(0.136)

0.247**
(0.070)

Education

-0.177
(0.189)

-0.121
(0.208)

0.324*
(0.158)

0.329**
(0.122)

0.297***
(0.042)

Hospitals

-1.062
(0.885)

1.633**
(0.494)

-0.875
(1.034)

-0.034
(0.142)

0.681***
(0.075)

Environment

-0.332
(0.248)

-0.431*
(0.189)

0.547*
(0.245)

0.406**
(0.127)

0.114
(0.069)

Health (not Hospitals)

-0.096
(0.217)

0.051
(0.161)

0.554**
(0.193)

0.206
(0.125)

0.295***
(0.044)

Human Services

-0.063
(0.169)

0.036
(0.150)

0.421**
(0.144)

0.319**
(0.103)

0.176***
(0.037)

International

0.902
(0.563)

0.781⁺
(0.434)

1.442***
(0.223)

0.593***
(0.134)

0.564***
(0.063)

Public Benefit

0.173
(0.203)

0.031
(0.185)

0.497**
(0.178)

0.180
(0.144)

0.363***
(0.049)

Religious

0.258
(0.244)

0.588*
(0.226)

0.798***
(0.209)

0.496***
(0.125)

0.407***
(0.052)
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Table 13 continued
Assets

0.439***
(0.031)

0.456***
(0.029)

0.024
(0.020)

0.013
(0.011)

-0.017***
(0.004)

Age

0.217***
(0.061)

0.168**
(0.054)

-0.150*
(0.061)

0.061*
(0.029)

-0.082***
(0.013)

Fulton/DeKalb County

0.706***
(0.105)

0.389***
(0.088)

-0.285**
(0.097)

0.022
(0.047)

0.030
(0.022)

years)

-0.001
(0.009)

-0.001
(0.008)

0.016⁺
(0.008)

0.016**
(0.005)

Government Grants

0.013
(0.009)

0.036***
(0.006)

-0.023**
(0.008)

-0.002
(0.003)

Contributions Reliance

0.110*
(0.042)

-0.275***
(0.033)

Contributions (previous 3

N Organizations
N Markets

1,364
668

1,364
668

Significance: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, Standard Errors in parentheses
All variables other than dummies are in log form.
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-0.145***
(0.025)
1,364
668

1,364
668

1,364
668

Table 14: Explaining Foundation Grant Distribution Full Models
Model 6
Grantee

Model 7
N Grants

Intercept

-1.498***
(0.293)

-2.105***
(0.139)

-803,857***
(120,897)

Competition

-1.313***
(0.086)

-0.505***
(0.037)

-267,135***
(35,195)

Foundation Activity

0.882***
(0.050)

0.673***
(0.042)

295,295***
(37,165)

Higher Education

-2.793***
(0.506)

-0.767***
(0.169)

-190,683
(220,465)

Education

-0.053
(0.355)

0.083
(0.129)

-34,187
(128,579)

Hospitals

-1.604
(1.255)

-1.129⁺
(0.660)

-792,892
(614,014)

Environment

0.340
(0.406)

-0.012
(0.158)

-28,271
(175,839)

Health (not Hospitals)

-0.253
(0.385)

-0.107
(0.127)

-96,540
(126,686)

Human Services

-0.149
(0.301)

-0.109
(0.096)

-158,843
(109,768)

International

-0.794
(0.642)

-0.715**
(0.271)

-56,561
(256,063)

Public Benefit

-0.068
(0.342)

-0.023
(0.129)

-9,198
(129,005)

Religious

0.792⁺
(0.453)

-0.099
(0.191)

-62,028
(177,874)

Program Efficiency

0.645*
(0.254)

0.362**
(0.122)

L1 Organization Variables
L2 Market Variables
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Model 8
Total Grant
Amounts

225,327***
(72,086)

Table 14 continued
Fundraising Expenses

0.196**
(0.065)

0.077*
(0.030)

Assets

0.272***
(0.054)

0.153***
(0.030)

127,718***
(18,838)

Age

0.093
(0.119)

0.084
(0.057)

-18,172
(42,602)

Fulton/DeKalb County

0.651**
(0.181)

0.318***
(0.071)

106,509
(70,203)

Contributions (previous 3 years)

0.016
(0.016)

0.008
(0.008)

5,841
(5,647)

Government Grants

0.040**
(0.015)

0.017**
(0.006)

11,916**
(5,447)

Contributions Reliance

0.215**
(0.074)

0.070*
(0.032)

62,982**
(25,601)

1,364
668

1,364
668

1,364
668

N Organizations
N Markets

55,869***
(20,551)

Dep. Var. = Received a grant (Model 7), Total number of grants received (Model 8), Total dollar amounts of grants received (Model
9)
Significance: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, Standard Errors in parentheses
All variables other than dummies are in log form.
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Table 15: Competition and the Importance of Program Efficiency and Fundraising Full
Models
Model 9
Grantee

Model 10
N Grants

Model 11
Total Grant
Amounts

Intercept

-1.557***
(0.287)

-2.129***
(0.147)

-889,355***
(118,634)

Competition

-1.393***
(0.116)

-0.668***
(0.040)

-319,425***
(33,774)

Foundation Activity

0.882***
(0.056)

0.697***
(0.042)

326,770***
(36,645)

Education

-0.100
(0.373)

0.034
(0.161)

-71,351
(126,602)

Health

-0.320
(0.460)

-0.150
(0.172)

-40,401
(125,211)

Human Services

-0.197
(0.301)

-0.048
(0.106)

-105,422
(108,526)

Other

0.282
(0.361)

0.044
(0.132)

13,350
(113,573)

Program Efficiency

2.801**
(0.963)

0.637⁺
(0.353)

398,801⁺
(224,465)

*Competition

1.094**
(0.334)

0.292*
(0.122)

170,613⁺
(87,247)

*Foundation Activity

-0.126
(0.129)

0.040
(0.062)

-59,834
(88,102)

*Education

-3.793**
(1.230)

-0.874
(0.535)

41,607
(53,834)

*Health

0.022
(1.731)

0.016
(0.672)

-64,575
(53,159)

*Human Services

-2.235⁺
(1.198)

-0.502
(0.411)

-33,810
(50,150)

L1 Organization Variables
L2 Market Variables
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Table 15 continued
-2.784*
(1.210)

-0.490
(0.436)

479.8
(50,834)

0.208
(0.210)

0.021
(0.071)

14,742
(48,621)

*Competition

0.047
(0.051)

0.079***
(0.013)

26,666*
(12,139)

*Foundation Activity

-0.007
(0.022)

-0.002
(0.016)

34,073**
(11,911)

*Education

0.038
(0.248)

0.040
(0.068)

*Health

0.074
(0.252)

0.051
(0.058)

*Human Services

0.121
(0.229)

0.029
(0.054)

*Other

-0.097
(0.235)

-0.051
(0.055)

Assets

0.261***
(0.055)

0.123***
(0.024)

Age

0.110
(0.129)

0.067
(0.054)

-19,312
(41,777)

Fulton/DeKalb County

0.697**
(0.209)

0.311***
(0.076)

92,542
(68,709)

Contributions (previous 3 years)

0.030
(0.019)

0.016*
(0.007)

8,872
(5,441)

Government Grants

0.042*
(0.017)

0.016**
(0.005)

9,829⁺
(5,215)

Contributions Reliance

0.367***
(0.083)

0.114**
(0.033)

74,465**
(24,856)

1,364
668

1,364
668

*Other
Fundraising Expenses

N Organizations
N Markets

1,364
668
97

105,068***
(18,399)

Table 15 continued
Dep. Var. = Received a grant (Model 9), Total number of grants received (Model 10), Total dollar amounts of grants received (11)
Subsector-Fundraising Expenses interaction variables are omitted from Model 11 due to collinearity
Significance: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, Standard Errors in parentheses
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Table 16: Competition and the Importance of Program Efficiency and Fundraising
Supplemental Full Model
L1 Organization Variables
L2 Market Variables

Model 12
N Grants

Intercept

0.324
(0.554)

Competition

-1.499***
(0.134)

Foundation Activity

0.835***
(0.189)

Education

-0.024
(0.682)

Health

0.187
(0.672)

Human Services

0.226
(0.584)

Other

0.972
(0.564)

Program Efficiency

0.451
(0.456)

*Competition

0.423**
(0.126)

*Foundation Activity

-0.063
(0.133)

*Education

-0.965
(0.619)

*Health

-0.272
(0.726)

*Human Services

-0.769
(0.506)
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Table 16 continued
-0.823
(0.527)

*Other

Fundraising Expenses

-0.031
(0.052)

*Competition

0.083***
(0.012)

*Foundation Activity

-0.012
(0.018)

*Education

0.005
(0.061)

*Health

-0.022
(0.061)

*Human Services

-0.020
(0.053)

*Other

-0.083
(0.051)

Assets

0.121***
(0.024)

Age

0.085
(0.051)

Fulton/DeKalb County

0.315***
(0.072)

Contributions (previous 3 years)

0.013*
(0.007)

Government Grants

0.015**
(0.005)

Contributions Reliance

0.096**
(0.033)

N Organizations

1,364

100

Table 16 continued
N Markets

668

Dep. Var. = Total number of grants received
Significance: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, Standard Errors in parentheses
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